Showing posts with label knowledge economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label knowledge economy. Show all posts

Saturday, September 30, 2017

30/9/17: Technological Revolution is Fizzling Out, as Ideas Get Harder to Find


Nicholas Bloom, Charles Jones, John Van Reenen, and Michael Webb’s latest paper has just landed in my mailbox and it is an interesting one. Titled “Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?” (September 2017, NBER Working Paper No. w23782. http://www.nber.org/papers/w23782.pdf) the paper asks a hugely important question related to the supply side of the secular stagnation thesis that I have been writing about for some years now (see explainer here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html and you can search my blog for key words “secular stagnation” to see a large number of papers and data points on the matter). Specifically, the new paper addresses the question of whether technological innovations are becoming more efficient - or put differently, if there is any evidence of productivity growth in innovation.

The reason this topic is important is two-fold. Firstly, as authors note: “In many growth models, economic growth arises from people creating ideas, and the long-run growth rate is the product of two terms: the effective number of researchers and their research productivity.” But, secondly, the issue is important because we have been talking in recent years about self-perpetuating virtuous cycles of innovation:

  • Clusters of innovation engendering more innovation;
  • Growth in ‘knowledge capital’ or ‘knowledge economies’ becoming self-sustaining; and
  • Expansion of AI and other ‘learning’ fields leading to exponential growth in knowledge (remember, even the Big Data was supposed to trigger this).

So what do the authors find?

“We present a wide range of evidence from various industries, products, and firms showing that research effort is rising substantially while research productivity is declining sharply.” In other words, there is no evidence of self-sustained improvements in research productivity or in the knowledge economies.

Worse, there is a diminishing marginal returns in technology, just as there is the same for every industry or sector of the economy: “A good example is Moore's Law. The number of researchers required today to achieve the famous doubling every two years of the density of computer chips is more than 18 times larger than the number required in the early 1970s. Across a broad range of case studies at various levels of (dis)aggregation, we find that ideas — and in particular the exponential growth they imply — are getting harder and harder to find. Exponential growth results from the large increases in research effort that offset its declining productivity.”

We are on the extensive margin when it comes to knowledge creation and innovation, which - to put it differently - makes ‘innovation-based economies’ equivalent to ‘coal mining’ ones: to achieve the next unit of growth these economies require an ever increasing input of resources.

Computers are not the only sector where the authors find this bleak reality. “We consider detailed microeconomic evidence on idea production functions, focusing on places where we can get the best measures of both the output of ideas and the inputs used to produce them. In addition to Moore’s Law, our case studies include agricultural productivity (corn, soybeans, cotton, and wheat) and medical innovations. Research productivity for seed yields declines at about 5% per year. We find a similar rate of decline when studying the mortality improvements associated with cancer and heart disease.” And more: “We find substantial heterogeneity across firms, but research productivity is declining in more than 85% of our sample. Averaging across firms, research productivity declines at a rate of around 10% per year.”

This is really bad news. In recent years, we have seen declines in labor productivity and capital productivity, and TFP (the residual measuring technological productivity). Now, knowledge productivity is falling too. There is literally no input into production function one can think of that can be measured and is not showing a decline in productivity.

The ugly facts presented in the paper reach across the entire U.S. economy: “Perhaps research productivity is declining sharply within every particular case that we look at and yet not declining for the economy as a whole. While existing varieties run into diminishing returns, perhaps new varieties are always being invented to stave this off. We consider this possibility by taking it to the extreme. Suppose each variety has a productivity that cannot be improved at all, and instead aggregate growth proceeds entirely by inventing new varieties. To examine this case, we consider research productivity for the economy as a whole. We once again find that it is declining sharply: aggregate growth rates are relatively stable over time, while the number of researchers has risen enormously. In fact, this is simply another way of looking at the original point of Jones (1995), and for this reason, we present this application first to illustrate our methodology. We find that research productivity for the aggregate U.S. economy has declined by a factor of 41 since the 1930s, an average decrease of more than 5% per year.”

This evidence further confirms the supply side of the secular stagnation thesis. Technological revolution has been slowing down over recent decades (not recent years) and we are clearly past the peak of the TFP growth of the 1940s, and the local peak of the 1990s (the ‘fourth wave’ of technological revolution).


Update June 7, 2018: A new version of the paper is available at https://web.stanford.edu/~chadj/IdeaPF.pdf.

Thursday, September 28, 2017

28/9/17: Irish Migration: Some Good News in 2017


While headline figures for net migration to Ieland paint an overall positive picture in the annual data (provided on April-April basis) for 2017, there are some creases on the canvas, both good and bad.

Top line numbers are good: net inward migration posted a print of 19,800 in 2017, up on 16,200 in 2016 and 5,900 in 2015. This marks the third year of positive inflows. However, on a cumulative basis, the last three years are still falling short of offsetting massive outflows recorded in 2010-2014. Cumulatively, between 2010 and 2017, the overall net migration stands at -65,900. Taking last two years’ average net inward immigration, it will take Ireland almost 4 years to cover the shortfall. Worse, on pre-crisis trend (omitting peak inward migration years of 2005-2007), we should be seeing inward net migration of around 27,100, well above the current rate. And on a cumulative basis, were the pre-crisis trends to remain unbroken, we would have added 487,600 residents between 2000 and 2017, instead of the actual addition of 394,500 over the same period. 


So things are improving and getting toward healthy, but we are not quite there, yet.

And there are other points of concern. Primary one is the fact that net inward migration remains negative for Irish nationals: in 2017, net outflow of Irish nationals fell to 3,400 from 8,700 in 2016. However, the figures continue to record net outflows for 8th year in a row. Over the period of 2010-2017, Ireland lost net 139,800 nationals.

On a positive side, there is net inflow of all other nationalities into Ireland, with non-EU nationals inflows jumping (net basis) to 15,7000 in 2017, the highest levels on record (albeit records only start from 2006). It is impossible to tell from CSO figures which nationalities are driving these numbers - a crucial point when it comes to assessing the nature of inflows.


Final point worth making is a positive one: in 2017, Ireland recorded another year or growth in - already strong - net inflows of skills and human capital as reflected both in age demographics and educational attainment. By educational attainment, third level graduates and higher category of net inflows posted another historical record in 2017 at 23,600, topping 2016 record of 20,800. Since 2009, including the years of the acute crisis of 2010-2012, Ireland added net 61,000 new immigrants and returned migrants with third level and higher education. This is consistent with continued recovery in human capital-intensive sectors of the economy and is a huge net positive for Ireland.


Hence, overall, the figures for migration are on the balance positive, although some pockets of weaknesses continue to remain and pose a challenge to the arguments about the breadth and depth of the recovery to-date.

Thursday, October 22, 2015

22/10/15: Gig Economy and Human Capital: Evidence from Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment


In a couple of weeks, I will be speaking about the role of human capital in the emergence of the new economy at the CXC Corporate event “Globalization & The Future of Work Summit” in Dublin.

Without preempting what I am going to say, here are some key points of interest.

Human capital-centric growth is overlapping, but distinct from the so-called “Gig Economy”, primarily because of the different definition of what constitutes two respective workforces.

Take, for example, the U.S. data. Based on research by the American Action Forum by Rinehart and Gitis (2015) we can define three types of the broadly-speaking “Gig Economy” workers: “For our most narrow measurement of gig workers (labeled Gig 1) we simply include independent contractors, consultants, and freelancers. Our middle measurement (Gig 2) includes all Gig 1 workers plus temp agency workers and on-call workers. Our broadest measurement (Gig 3) includes all Gig 2 workers plus contract company workers.”

The respective numbers engaged in three categories in 2014 range between 20.5 million and 29.7 million with growth rates over the recent years outpacing economy-wide jobs expansion rates across all categories of the Gig Economy workers.

Still, the key problem with identifying underlying trends in the development of the Gig Economy is the lack of data on specifics of occupational choices of the self-employed individuals and the relationship between these choices and human capital held by the Gig Economy participants relative to the traditional employees.

To see the indicators of links between the Gig Economy and human capital, we have to look at the more established literature concerning transition to entrepreneurship.

One interesting set of studies here comes from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a large biannual household survey conducted by the Banca d’Italia. A 2007 paper by Federici, Ferrante and Vistocco looked at the links between institutional structures, technological innovation and human capital in determining the propensity to transition from employment to entrepreneurship. Looking at the general literature on the subject, the authors state that “…institutions are more important than technology (i.e., technological specialization and/or industry composition) in fostering or restricting entrepreneurship and that the interactions between institutions and occupational choices may be complex and non linear”. The authors caution against directly linking self-employment rates with entrepreneurship rates, as “countries displaying the same self-employment rates, might be endowed with very different amounts and qualities of entrepreneurial skills devoted to innovation and business ventures (or, on the other hand, they might not)”.

To better pinpoint the link between entrepreneurship, self-employment and the institutional and technological drivers for risk taking, Federici, Ferrante and Vistocco augment the survey data with a set of variables describing the social and institutional environment in which self-employed and traditional workers are operating. Crucially, “in addition to standard indexes of economic and social infrastructure at the local level, [the authors] include a measure of creativity developed by Florida (2004).”

The conclusions are strong: “in Italy, both institutional and technological factors have shaped entrepreneurial opportunities requiring, tacit knowledge embedded in social networks and in the cultural background of families… Hence, well-educated people lacking privileged access to tacit knowledge and, in particular, an appropriate family background, could find themselves up against a considerable barrier to entrepreneurship and occupational mobility.” In simple terms, the Gig Economy-related value added can and should be considered within the context of family and cultural institutions as much as technological enablement environment.

As per traditional metrics of human capital, the study conclusions appear to be contradicting the core literature on entrepreneurship. “The evidence of the highly significant negative role of education in entrepreneurial selection is very strong in comparison with the majority of international studies showing that education has either a positive impact (Blanchflower, 1998) or a statistically non-significant effect on occupational choices”. In other words, formal education seems to be more conducive to employment choices in traditional environments (e.g. full time jobs),w it exception, perhaps, of professional skills-based activities.

The negative links between education and propensity to engage in entrepreneurial activity is, however, in line with other Italian study based on the same data, authored by Sabatini (2006).

However, U.S. data-based studies frequently find existence of a U-shaped relationship between income and propensity to transition to self-employment, with highest propensities concentrated around low income earners and high income earners, while lower propensities occurring for middle income earners. One recent example of this evidence is Moutray (2007). In so far as formal education is an instrument for income, especially for sub-populations excluding very high income earners, this suggests that the negative relationship between self-employment and education found in the case of Italy can be culturally conditioned and does not translate to other economies.

Another interesting aspect of transition to the ‘Gig Economy’ relating to the links between human capital and creativity or cultural institutions was uncovered by a 2011 paper by Mitra and Abubakar who looked at data from the Local Authority Districts of Thames Gateway South Essex (TGSE) in East of England. The study attempted “to explore and identify key determinants of business formation in Knowledge Intensive sectors (which include the creative industries) of regions outside the major metropolitan conurbations, and their possible differences with other Non-Intensive Sectors.”

The authors found that human capital is “positively correlated with new business entry in Knowledge intensive sectors”, but at the same time, it is “negatively correlated with new startups in non-knowledge intensive sectors”. Per authors: “This finding suggests that while entrepreneurship in knowledge based and creative industries requires highly skilled labour, in non knowledge based industries, low skilled labour is the primary determinant of new firm creation. Our findings also appear to suggest the need for higher skills/educated base in order to boost the growth of new businesses” in high knowledge-intensity sectors.

Werner and Moog (2009) use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to map out significant linkages between entrepreneurial learning (and entrepreneurial human capital) and the probability of transition from traditional employment to self-employment. One interesting aspect of their findings is that learning-by-doing occurring (in their sample) during tenure of working for an SME has positive impact on ability to transition to entrepreneurship, confirming similar findings from other European countries. This also confirms findings that show that working for SMEs results in more frequent exits into self-employment and that such exits more frequently result in transition to full entrepreneurship than for self-employment entered from employment in larger firms.

The learning-by-doing effect of pre-transition experience for starting entrepreneurs and self-employed is also confirmed by the UK study by Panos, Pouliakas and Zangelidis (2011) who looked at the self-employment transition dynamics for individuals with dual job-holding and the links between this transition and human capital and occupational choice between primary and secondary jobs. The study used a wide (1991-2005) sample of UK employees from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The authors investigated, sequentially, “first, the determinants of multiple job-holding, second, the factors affecting the occupational choice of a secondary job, third, the relationship between multiple-job holding and job mobility and, lastly, the spillover effects of multiple job-holding on occupational mobility between primary jobs.” The findings indicate that “dual job-holding may facilitate job transition, as it may act as a stepping-stone towards new primary jobs, particularly self-employment.” An interesting aspect of the study is that whilst the major effects are present in the lower skilled distribution of occupations, there is also a significant and positive effect of dual-jobs holding on transition to self-employment for professional (highly skilled) grade of workers.

Finally, there is a very interesting demographic dimension to transition to self-employment, explored to some extent in the U.S. data by Zhang (2008). The paper focused on the topic of elderly entrepreneurship. The author conjectures that in modern (ageing) demographic setting, “the “knowledge economy” could elevate the value of elderly human capital as the “knowledge economy” is less physically demanding and more human-capital- and knowledge-based.” Zhang (2008) largely finds that professional, skills-based self-employment and entrepreneurship amongst the older generations of workers can act as an important force in reducing adverse impact of ageing on modern economies.


The common thread connecting the above studies and indeed the rest of the vast literature on entrepreneurship, self-employment and transition from traditional employment to more projects-based or client-focused forms of engagement in the labour markets is increasingly shifting toward the first type of the ‘Gig Economy’ engagement. This typology of the ‘Gig Economy’ is becoming more human capital and skills-intensive and is better aligned with the ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘creative economy’ than ever before. In simple terms, therefore, the ‘Gig Economy’ not only reaches deeper than the traditional view of the shared services (Uber et al) growth trends suggest.

While both increasing in importance and broadening the set of opportunities for economic development, the modern ‘Gig Economy’ is presenting significant challenges to social, cultural and policy norms that require swift addressing. These challenges are broadly linked to the need to Create, Attract, Retain and Enable key human capital necessary to sustain long term development and growth of the ‘Gig Economy’.

With that, tune in to my talk at the CXC Corporate event “Globalization & The Future of Work Summit” (link: http://cxccorporateservices.com/cxc-future-of-work/) in few weeks time for the details as to what should be done to put global ‘Gig Economy’ onto the sustainable development and growth track.


Sources:

Will Rinehart, Ben Gitis, “Independent Contractors and the Emerging Gig Economy” July 29, 2015,

Federici, Daniela and Ferrante, Francesco and Vistocco, Domenico, "On the Sources of Entrepreneurial Talent in Italy: Tacit vs. Codified Knowledge" (July 24, 2007)

Sabatini, Fabio, "Educational Qualification, Work Status and Entrepreneurship in Italy: An Exploratory Analysis" (June 2006). FEEM Working Paper No. 87.2006

Velamuri, S. Ramakrishna and Venkataraman, S., "An Empirical Study of the Transition from Paid Work to Self-Employment". Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-16, August 2005

Moutray, Chad M., "Educational Attainment and Other Characteristics of the Self-Employed: An Examination Using Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics" (December 11, 2007). Hudson Institute Research Paper No. 07-06.

Mitra, Jay and Abubakar, Yazid, "Entrepreneurial Growth and Labour Market Dynamics: Spatial Factors in the Consideration of Relevant Skills and Firm Growth in the Creative, Knowledge-Based Industries" (August 23, 2011). University of Essex CER Working Paper No. 1.

Werner, Arndt and Moog, Petra M., "Why Do Employees Leave Their Jobs for Self-Employment? – The Impact of Entrepreneurial Working Conditions in Small Firms" (November 1, 2009).

Panos, Georgios A. and Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Zangelidis, Alexandros, "Multiple Job Holding as a Strategy for Skills Diversification and Labour Market Mobility" (August 23, 2011). University of Essex CER Working Paper No. 4.

Zhang, Ting, "Elderly Entrepreneurship in an Aging U.S. Economy: It's Never Too Late" (September 8, 2008). Series on Economic Development and Growth, Vol. 2.

Saturday, December 27, 2014

27/12/2014: Are Graduate Students Rational?


A fascinating study into expectations formation mechanism for career outlooks by entering doctoral students in the US. Authored by Blume-Kohout, Margaret and Clack, John, titled "Are Graduate Students Rational? Evidence from the Market for Biomedical Scientists" (PLoS ONE 8(12): e82759, December 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2506810) the paper looks into whether entering graduate students make rational choices in selecting specific fields of study, given information available in the jobs markets.

The authors use increases in the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget from 1998 through 2003 that in turn also "increased demand for biomedical research, raising relative wages and total employment in the market for biomedical scientists." This should send a signal to incoming students that biomedical research careers prospects have been expanding. This signal is not the same as a signal of what one can expect of the biomedical careers prospects in the future for a number of reasons. Crucially, if at early stages of funding expansion wages and career promotions for those already in biomedical profession were rising fast, any future increase in supply of biomedical professions will reduce earnings and career prospects for future entrants into profession. In other words, current conditions are not identical to future conditions.

This is especially salient in professional fields where studying and research required for qualifying into profession requires a long period of time, such as biomedical field. where "research doctorates in biomedical sciences can often take six years or more to complete."

Hence, in biomedical field, "the full labor supply response to such changes in market conditions is not immediate, but rather is observed over a period of several years."

If prospective students considering entering doctoral studies were rational (in economic sense), they should not tai current conditions in the filed for granted and should instead "anticipate these future changes, and also that students take into account the opportunity costs of their pursuing graduate training."

As authors note, "prior empirical research on student enrollment and degree completions in science and engineering (S&E) fields indicates that “cobweb” expectations prevail: that is, at least in theory, prospective graduate students respond to contemporaneous changes in market wages and employment, but do not forecast further changes that will arise by the time they complete their degrees and enter the labor market."

The Blume-Kohout and Clak analysed "time-series data on wages and employment of biomedical scientists versus alternative careers, on completions of S&E bachelor's degrees and biomedical sciences PhDs, and on research expenditures funded both by NIH and by biopharmaceutical firms, to examine the responsiveness of the biomedical sciences labor supply to changes in market conditions."

They find evidence rejecting rational expectations model of students' decision making: "Consistent with previous studies, we find that enrollments and completions in biomedical sciences PhD programs are responsive to market conditions at the time of students' enrollment. More striking, however, is the close correspondence between graduate student enrollments and completions, and changes in availability of NIH-funded traineeships, fellowships, and research assistantships."

In other words, state-funded research can contribute to over-production of future doctoral graduates later in the period of increased funding, exacerbating future wages downturns for later stage doctoral graduates, and at the same time fuel increased inflows of new entrants into profession.

Monday, February 10, 2014

10/2/2014: Data shows Irish R&D policy is not exactly producing...


Today, Grant Thornton published their review of the Irish R&D Tax Credits policy, available here: http://www.grantthornton.ie/db/Attachments/Review-of-RandD-tax-credit-regime.pdf?utm_content=buffer1e77c&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Top level conclusions:

  • "60% of the companies that responded to the survey were indigenous Irish companies with 40% multinationals"
  • "35% of companies conducting R&D activities engaged in joint research projects with other parties in 2011"
  • "with 19.5% being activities with higher education or institutes within Ireland and 8% outside Ireland"
  • "70% of claims are by companies with less than 50 employees"
  • "large companies with employees of more than 250 employees account for 10% of claims made. However they account for 45% of claims on a monetary basis"

"The credit is a largely positive scheme with real value being added to the economy from it."

My view: too much of subsidy to MNCs, too little evidence the scheme is not being used by SMEs to fund activity that would have been funded anyway and too little evidence the scheme is being used to fund genuine R&D rather than business development.

But aside from this, there is little evidence that funding is yielding any serious uptick in intellectual property generation. Here's the latest data from the NewMorningIP on patents filings in Ireland.


Based on quarterly aggregates, in Q4 2013, total number of Irish academic patents hit the lowest reading of 48 and the goal number of filed patents match this performance at 593. Irish inventions overall sunk to the lowest level of 236 (previous low was 252 for Q3 2012, imputed on incomplete data). Patents applications by non-academic filers stood at 188 - the lowest level in data series.

Overall, in 2013, there were 2561 patents applications, of which Irish total filings amounted to 1072 (41.9%) and of which Irish non-academic patents applications were just 860 (33.6%). This is hardly stellar and cannot be deemed sustainable for the economy that is allegedly based on innovation. It also makes clear that current system of R&D incentives and supports, including tax credit, is not working.

Friday, July 26, 2013

26/7/2013: Forfas Report 2012: A Handy Guide to 'Egg-Face' Collision


Ireland has been described as a 'Knowledge Economy", a science and R&D intensive economy, and island of Scholars (yes, while ago we also allegedly had saints). We have enough science development policy 'platforms' to fill TCD's Long Room. And we do spend some dish on funding science.

One of the organisations, responsible for shaping policy and assessing effectiveness of all of these and other 'platforms' is Forfas - a state body in charge of economic policy supports. You can read all the glorious descriptions of what Forfas does here: http://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/forfas-annual-report-2012.pdf

And this week, RTE reported the following nice stats about this beacon of knowledge and research (full article here: http://www.rte.ie/news/2013/0724/464489-forfas-pension/?goback=%2Egde_2825341_member_260797418)

  • "The pension scheme at State enterprise body Forfas has a net deficit of almost €1.2 billion" (to be more precise: €1,187,674,000 - up 22% from €972,389,000 in 2011). Note: "Forfas administers the pensions of a number of agencies including Forfas, Enterprise Ireland, IDA Ireland, Science Foundation Ireland and the predecessors of those agencies."
  • "The report also states that 78% of last year's €51.4m Oireachtas grant to Forfas went to pay pensions - with just 22% spent on policy activities, corporate and shared services."
  • "The cost of payments to pensioners rose from by over 23% from €35.3m in 2011 to just under €43.5m last year."
  • But wait, there's more: "'non-effective expenditure' of €1.4m relating to rents for unoccupied office space.

On top of the figures highlighted in the RTE article, here are the actual breakdowns from the annual report:

  • EUR79.052mln was total income received by Forfas from all sources in 2012, down on EUR79.229mln in 2011.
  • Pensions spending was EUR61.372mln in 2012 or 77.63% of total income. In 2011 the same was EUR60.424 or 76.27%.

So: EUR43.5m on pensions, EUR1.4m on wasted rent, our of EUR51.4m grant means that Forfas has managed to spend ca EUR44.9m from EUR51.4m on… err… being a well-housed pension administrator. Less than 12.65% of the organisation grant went to fund its activities.

Seriously, folks, this does not give one much confidence in getting 'value for money'…

Updated: A comment from a senior science body head in Ireland: "I was gobsmacked to see this figure. I wonder how much of the country's so-called €500m 'science' budget goes on pensions? This is not to begrudge retired public servants their entitlements, but we should be transparent about what we spend on science & what we spend on other things."

Thursday, November 8, 2012

8/11/2012: OECD Internet economy outlook 2012: Part 5 Conclusions

By now, I have posted 4 different posts on the OECD Internet Economy Report 2012 and the implications arising from the OECD data for Ireland. The core points of these posts are:

  1. Overall ICT-linked employment in Ireland is declining, not rising, as the share of total employment in 1995-2009, despite the fact that we have experienced a virtual collapse in the traditional sectors activity over the same period of time (Part 1 post);
  2. Growth in ICT sector revenues has been below OECD average in Ireland during 2000-2011 period, in contrast to the claimed successes in attracting ICT sector FDI into the country and contradicting the Government claims that Ireland-based ICT suppliers are consistently enhancing the value-added activity here (Part 1 post);
  3. In addition, growth rate in the sector revenues in Ireland at roughly half the OECD average rate of growth is coincident with unprecedented growth in expatriated profits by the MNCs and massive in scale tax optimization ongoing within the MNCs component of the ICT economy here. This suggests that actual real activity might be declining, not growing, in Ireland (Part 1 post);
  4. ICT investment by asset-type and overall in 2010 in Ireland was exceptionally poor, ranking the country as the 5th from the bottom despite the Government claims that Ireland was the leading destination for attracting FDI in Europe (with FDI into Ireland dominated by ICT services)  (Part 1 post);
  5. Business R&D investment in ICT-related areas in Ireland ranked the country in 10th place in the OECD in 2010, once again contrasting the claims by the Government that Ireland is an ICT investment hub  (Part 1 post);
  6. Business use of the internet in 2011 sees Ireland ranked 5th from the bottom (Part 4 post) despite having access to a broadband connection above OECD average (Part 4 post);
  7. We score rather poorly in terms of our broadband infrastructure quality, penetration (Part 2 post) and poorly (well below average) for broadband access in the most economically developed region of the country (Part 4 post);
  8. More significantly, we score poorly in terms of the quality of our human capital when it coms to ICT-enabled economy: less than OECD average is the share of Irish residents who used internet for communicating in 2010; we have the third lowest percentage of internet users who created a web page in 2011; we score at the average in terms of individuals engaging in ordering or purchasing goods or services online in 2011; below OECD average in terms of use of banking services online and close to average use of internet for learning in 2010 (Part 2 post);
  9. For the 'smart workforce' claimed, irish share of employed persons at work using an internet-connected computer ranks below EU15 average and Ireland sports average rates of growth in this metric for 2005-2011 period (Part 4 post);
  10. Despite having above average proportion of schools with internet connection in 2009, we had well below average usage of these connections, suggesting that our education system is incapable of using modern tools of learning (Part 3 post);
  11. Consequently to (9), we have below average percentage of individuals using the internet to obtain information from the public authorities websites in 2011 - the outcome that can be expected in a country where education system is incapable of using web-based platforms (Part 3 post);
  12. Ireland scores fifth from the bottom in terms of internet users using P2P file sharing to exchange content in 2011 (Part 3 post);
  13. Ireland scores average in internet use by the highest educated segment of its population, below average in internet use by medium-educated households and average in internet use by the low-education households (Part 3 post);
  14. Irish businesses have close to average (OECD) percentage of businesses with a website (Part 4 post);
  15. Less than EU15, EU27 and OECD average proportion of Irish companies share information electronically externally, and the same holds for companies using automatic data exchange to receive or send e-invoices in 2010-2011 (Part 4 post);
  16. We rank 9th in the OECD in the total turnover of companies from e-commerce in 2011 (as % of total turnover) despite the fact that we are clearing huge volumes of transactions for ICT services MNC giants like google, linkedin, etc (Part 4 post);
  17. We rank 10th in the OECD in terms of companies selling over the internet in 2011 (Part 4 post)

In brief, Ireland is not an ICT services and culture hub, but at best an average performer in the group of advanced economies.

Furthermore, per OECD data:

So Ireland scores 6th from the bottom in terms of share of ICT specialist users in the total economy back in 2010, with that share growing by lowest percentage of all countries save Greece and Portugal. The outcome is made more egregious to the Government claims of Ireland being a global ICT hub by the fact that between 1995 and 2010 Irish economy has been attracting massive inflows of FDI in the sector.

The OECD report is extremely disturbing in terms of the picture it paints of Irish internet-based economy and flies in the face of a number of traditional assertions about Ireland as the global ICT hub made by the Government, IDA and Enterprise Ireland, as well as our business lobby and quangoes.

Monday, November 5, 2012

5/11/2012: OECD Internet economy outlook 2012: part 4


This is the fourth note on the OECD Internet economy report 2012 (part 1part 2 and part 3 are linked here).

We hear much about the vast gap between Dublin and the rest of the country in digital economy. Usually this refers to the disparity of access. Yet, as the following illustrates, even the 'advantaged' Dublin scores poorly compared to its peers (other capital regionas) in the OECD:


For example, Dublin and Southern and Eastern region are worse than Scotland - the lowest scoring region in the UK. Too bad the folks at the WebSummit and other prime events in digital economy world converging onto Dublin have no clue just how poor we really are in terms of enabling and deploying ICT services-based economy. May be some of them will read these posts or the OECD document before they start extolling the virtues of Irish 'digital' economy.

But enough about the households. What about pioneering, innovative, R&D intensive, knowledge economy business environment here? After all, as I said earlier, ireland is home to so many MNCs in the sector and so one should expect business use of the web to be high...

Oops.. I thought we have hugely innovative start ups and MNCs popping up on every corner... After all, IDA and EI brochures are full of their smiling faces and sunny stories.

And usage is, as with schools, vastly lower than access:

Now, unimpressive record on the share of employees connected to the web and using it...
Equally interesting fact revealed by the above chart is that there is no impressive growth in this metric in 2005-2011 period, despite the fact that overall share should have risen dramatically due to obliteration of jobs in less computer- and web-enabled sectors such as basic consumer services and construction. In other words, the above chart shows conclusively that Irish economy is not becoming more knowledge-intensive even after jobs destruction wave sweeping traditional sectors.

The same ic confirmed by a different metric:

Remember the malarky about MNCs operations in Ireland being of great benefit to 'clustering' and 'spill-over of skills and know-how' to the broader economy? Why, it seems to be pretty much a lie too:

Per chart above, Ireland scores relatively well on internally shared systems and rather poorly on externally shared ones. In other words, if MNCs are creating knowledge and transfers here, they are more likely to keep them to themselves than to allow them to 'spill-over' to outside their own offices.

Ireland-based businesses are not even any good at invoicing via the web:

Of course, the headline figures on earnings generated via e-commerce are high, but these are grossly skewed by MNCs (e.g. google et al):

How I know that? Because the actual usage of e-based sales is poor in Ireland:
So revenue generation ranking above is skewed heavily by few businesses carrying out huge transactions volumes, not by broad reach of e-commerce.

And the same applies to ICT business spending on R&D:

Once again, more on the topic in the next post.

5/11/2012: OECD Internet economy outlook 2012: part 3


In part 1 and part 2 earlier I took a look at some stats coming from the OECD report published today and positioning Irish internet economy overall at the very best at-or-below the OECD average across e-business, connectivity and social use.

Let's continue wading through the massive report (linked in the first post above).

An interesting chart below:

This shows that Ireland overall scores relatively well in terms of schools access to the web - at least we are above the OECD average. But usage of this access is... well - well below the OECD average ranks Ireland closer to 7th from the bottom. So having access (public spending) is not equivalent to quality of use. In fact, ireland has the 5th largest gap in usage relative to access in the OECD.

Irish Government is equally poor at providing useful and user-friendly access to information on the web, on par with our sub-average performance in other ICT-enabled services:
Which is in line with general lack of transparency and engagement with services users on behalf of our State, where fixing potholes still requires a phone call to a local TDs, rather than a more modern and less corrupting approach of simply requesting a service from responsible authorities.

Back to utilization of basic ICT services:
No comment necessary.

And usability by our remarkably highly educated workforce? Why, average, again:

Remember, it's the workforce marvel that attracts MNCs into Ireland - the workforce where even highly educated don't really use the web, and where education system doesn't encourage use of the web in schools, and where stats for P2P file sharing, use in continued education, basic webpage publishing etc are all abysmally poor.

Never mind... just read an IDA brochure and believe!..

5/11/2012: OECD Internet economy outlook 2012: part 2

Here comes the second post on OECD Internet Economy Outlook 2012 report (first in the series was here), focusing on Ireland and the mythology of our 'global ICT services hub'.

So wading deeper into the OECD report, take a look at this chart:


Ireland hardly can boast of an advanced fibre infrastructure that would be consistent with real ICT economy, especially ICT services economy. Per OECD: "Fibre-based broadband connections offer the fastest data transfers..." Now, in many countries, deployment of fibre broadband is lower due to home ownership rates being lower (people tend to invest less in a fixed connection quality when they rent, other things held constant). In Ireland, abysmally low fibre coverage is coincident with very high home ownership rates.

Next up, given lack of fibre coverage, you'd think we should lead the world in overall penetration of the substitutes (e.g. wireless), although, of course, fixed fibre and wireless can be complementary to each other (e.g. fixed line at home, mobile on the go). Alas, not really:


And subsequently, the gap between broadband connections and overall internet connections in Ireland is high by comparative standards:
In fact, we are below both EU27 and OECD average on broadband coverage per above chart.

Next up: the world of data is becoming portable. And in particular it is becoming portably mobile - in other words, more and more access to data is now taking place via mobile devices, rather than portable computers... And in Ireland?
Despite all the talk about the new generation of mobile users, etc, Irish 'younger and more educated workforce' seems to be not using mobile devices.

Having netted into Ireland all flagships of ICT web communications services providers and having established ourselves as social networking capital of Europe, we show neither a dramatic rate of coverage for internet communications, nor a dramatic rate of growth from 2007 through 2011 in this category:

In fact, per OECD data, we have fewer internet users engaging in social networking than Greece, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary (overall, we rank 12th in the group of 24 countries in terms of this parameter).

And we are not exactly content-creative either:

E-commerce is absolutely average in its reach in Ireland too and is growing relatively slowly:

As is internet-based learning:
Do note that e-learning is associated strongly with continued or life-long education, so the above suggests we tend not to upskill much via continued education once we get our degrees. Not exactly a badge of honour.

More on this in the third post.

5/11/2012: OECD Internet economy outlook 2012: part 1



Quite an interesting chart from OECD on Ireland and its peers in terms of the spread / reach of the ICT economy. Now, keeping in mind that Ireland is, allegedly, a 'knowledge-based economy' with prime talent in ICT services, attracting huge share of global ICT services firms, etc... why is, then


Or put in words, why is Ireland is one of only 3 countries with shrinking, not growing proportion of workforce engaged in ICT sector?

Per OECD report (link here), Ireland had 3 firms represented in top 250 ICT firms globally, same as, for example South Africa (which is not calling itself a 'global ICT hub' last time I checked). Nonetheless, Ireland's count is large for our relative size. Alas, in 2000 total revenue of ICT firms in Ireland was estimated at USD29.04bn and that rose to USD42.8bn in 2011 - a rise of 47.4% or a growth rate of 3.6% annually. Not spectacular, considering worldwide sector revenue grew 108% over the same period of time expanding at an average annual rate of 6.9% per annum. In other words, Ireland's ICT 'global hub' managed to grow at slightly above 1/2 the global rate of growth.

Just when you thought things couldn't get much worse. Net revenues of the ICT sector in Ireland amounted to USD3.871 billion in 2000. You would expect this to rise dramatically by 2011, especially since globally net revenues grew 127% over 2000-2011 period. But no: Irish ICT sector net revenues have actually fallen USD3.444 billion in 2011.



Now, wait: gross revenues of ICT sector in Ireland underperformed global growth rates by a factor of almost two, while net revenues have shrunk. This hardly constitutes some huge success in attracting ICT FDI and creating a global ICT services hub.

Now, chart below shows just how much of a 'leading' light our FDI magnet in ICT sector really is:

Good news is that "On average, 20% of total BERD investment is focused on the ICT sector. But the data show very large differences across countries. In 2010, ICT BERD accounted for more than a half of total business R&D expenditure in Chinese Taipei, Greece, Finland and Korea. It accounted for more than 30% in Estonia (30%), Ireland (32%), Singapore (36%) and the United States (33%)." The problem, however, is that Ireland has one of the lowest BERD investment overall in the OECD economies, so 32% of a small number can be less than 16% of a larger one...

So here's the outcome:

I will continue blogging on the OECD report tonight, so stay tuned.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

08/12/2011: An even greater threat

Here's an even greater threat to Ireland's 'economic model' - the one based on attempting to attract into this country a new generation of FDI - FDI that is increasingly based on human capital-intensive activities.

BBC report here covers increasing mobility of skills across the borders (link). And I co-authored recently a report on this (here).

But Ireland, folks, is not a serious contender for this capital due to the confluence of the following trends here and abroad:

  1. Our taxes on top earnings - earnings associated with higher human capital, once we remove the egregiously high salaries at the top of the public sector bureaucracies and in sheltered private/semi-state sectors;
  2. Our quality of public services that can be meaningfully utilized by people with higher human capital is not up to scratch - in health, education, transport, urban amenities, cultural amenities and Government services;
  3. Our quality of promotional opportunities within the country is restricted, especially for foreign talent due to archaic promotion practices and cronyism; and
  4. Our quality of public discourse, when it comes to higher earners is toxic - in part justified by absurdities of our top public sector brass who enjoy earnings well in excess of their talents, and in part justified by our absurd 'bankers' whose performance in the past is also unmatched to their earnings.
So we are witnessing an outflow of key talent from Ireland. In recent months a large number of high quality academic researchers have packed up and left (or currently leaving) this country. In a number of sectors - including the 'flagship' ICT services sector - we are seeing jobs moving after key workers (not key executives, as our Government mistakenly thinks, judging by the special measures in the Budget 2012, but key skills-holders). In a number of sectors, we are failing to develop critical mass of skills and activities due to lack of talent - one example would be funds management in IFSC, the area where policymakers have been trying to build activity for some 5 years now.

Now, we might think that these issues should be priority number 734 or so on the list, given the gravity of our crisis, but they are not. Long term competitiveness no longer rests on simplified harmonized indicators for brawn labour, but on yet-to-be-compiled indicators of our human capital pool. And here, mass-produced degrees with plausible-sounding names of poorly ranked institutions on them won't do the job. Ireland is facing two roads ahead: one road leads to a low wage, low income autarky of skills, another to a high wage, high income open skills economy. So far, our policy wheels are pointed firmly in the direction of the former.

Saturday, November 5, 2011

05/11/2011: Patents and 'sticky' ROI on academic investment

In the previous post I covered some interesting data on hotspot universities (high impact academic institutions) around the world based on OECD data for 2009. Here is the data on high impact patents (EPO top 1 percent) through 2005 against data for the same through 2000.

About the only interesting trend in the above data, other than the one that reinforces the trends highlighted in the previous post is that there is tremendous 'stickiness' or resilience or historical dependence in the data. In other words, there is a 0.994% positive correlation between past performance in terms of highly cited patents and the later performance.

The above trend is of interest because it suggests that overall, league tables changes are difficult to achieve over the shorter period of time and also that ROI in academic research is itself relatively 'sticky', stretched over time.

The good news is that for the two periods, Irish patents applications have increased from 5 in 1996-2000 to 14 in 2001-2005 - a rise of 180%. The bad news, the average for 36 most advanced economies is 226% improvement over the same period of time.

Thursday, August 11, 2011

11/08/2011: Another 'black eye' for services supporting our 'knowledge economy'

Here's a disturbing story (hat tip to @BriMcS via Twitter) about the trials and tribulations of the Irish 'knowledge economy' arising from the traditional sectors market structure.

I wrote before about the abysmal quality of water supply - a key infrastructure input into 'knowledge economy' both in terms of pharma and biotech sectors, but also in terms of quality of life considerations that impact decisions by highly mobile and highly skilled 'knowledge'-intensive sectors workers to locate in the country.

I also wrote before about the poverty of Irish electricity supply (in terms of low quality and high cost) with ESB (state-owned dominant electricity market player) and Irish Regulator presiding over the generation and supply systems that routinely lead to electricity supply warnings in Trinity College, Dublin (Dublin city centre).

Here is another episode, this time directly impacting our Ireland-based 'knowledge economy' giants - Amazon and Microsoft:
  • The report of a 5-hour long (!) interruption of energy supply to Amazon and Microsoft’s cloud computing services based at Citywest (full report here). let me make 2 comments on this. Firstly, cloud computing services are targeted by the Irish Government for flagship development in Ireland, with hopes that cloud computing clusters can be created here by attracting foreign MNCs and building on their platforms domestic expertise and entrepreneurship. Secondly, the uo to 5 hours disruption was reported originally by the ESB Networks as a 1 hour disruption, which begs a question - does the industrial behemoth have a capacity to even accurately time in real time the extent of disruption to its services. Even a taxi company would be able to tell if their customers couldn't get their services for 1 hour or 5 hours.
  • Additional report (see here) cites another incident whereby on the same day another "knowledge economy" centre experienced "a voltage dip which lasted for less than one second".
The report above also cites Marguerite Sayers, Head of Asset Management at ESB Networks saying (emphasis is mine): “I can certainly confirm that this was an unexpected fault situation, with absolutely no advance warning, which did result in a voltage dip for many customers, in addition to supply loss for approximately 100 customers.” Which makes me wonder - does Irish ESB categorize fault situations into
  1. "Unexpected" as in the ones they cannot do anything about even in theory, and
  2. "Expected" as in the ones that can be prevented?
If so, how can a faul that is expected take place? By failure to prevent that which is preventable?

All of this is academic, of course. The hard fact is that while incidents do occur, there is something inherently incongruous in having an economic development policy that focuses on building 'knowledge economy' while retaining the market structure that cannot even assure basic quality of supply of energy and water to both residential and industrial users.

Saturday, November 6, 2010

Economics 6/11/10: Is Modern Academia Failing?

A very interesting paper titled "Withering Academia?" by Bruno S. Frey was published by CESIFO Working Paper 3209, October 2010 (download here).

From the abstract: "Strong forces lead to a withering of academia as it exists today. The major causal forces are:
  • the rankings mania,
  • increased division of labor in research,
  • intense publication pressure,
  • academic fraud,
  • dilution of the concept of “university,” and
  • inadequate organizational forms for modern research.
Academia, in a broader sense understood as “the locus of seeking truth and learning through methodological inquiry,” will subsist in different forms. The conclusion is therefore pessimistic with respect to the academic system as it presently exists but not to scholarly endeavour as such. However, the transformation predicted is expected to be fundamental."

This some pretty strong stuff.

"Today, in many disciplines, the importance of a scientific idea and the position of a scholar are defined by rankings. What matters nowadays is the recognition produced by a general rankings system, normally based only on the quantity of scientific output, irrespective of quality. If quality is considered, this is done by counting the number of citations. Rankings provide simple measures of relative position in science... Dependence on rankings has been substituted for consideration of content."

"The scientific production process has increasingly been divided into neatly separated steps. ...The division of labor has led to a more efficient and rapid output of scientific results but favors partial views and discourages comprehensive considerations." Interestingly, Frey refers here to the tendency to co-author papers, not to the more worrying (from my point of view) reduction in researchers' ability to think across disciplines and deeper into broader subjects.

"The incentives to publish are not necessarily the ideal ones to gain valuable new knowledge." The need to publish as much and as well as possible may influence the choice of:
  • Subjects studied
  • Methods used
  • Type of collaboration
  • Presentation of the results
  • "Extent scholars are ready to engage in “academic prostitution,” that is, to revise their paper according to the “suggestions” of the referees even if they know that they are questionable or even plainly wrong (see Frey 2003)."
"The stronger the publication pressure, the stronger are these deviations from how scholars
are ideally assumed to behave (Anderson et al. 2007). Overall, such practices undermine
the claim of academia to pursue true knowledge."

We've recently seen a massive scale exposure of these outcomes of research pressures in the case of environmental science publications. But Frey's arguments are much stronger than that - they are systemic in nature.

"It can be predicted that academic misconduct and fraud have increased over recent
decades. The major reason is not that scholars are less moral then they used to be. Instead, the incentives to cheat have greatly increased due to higher stress in academia." Frey offers an excellent, iconclastic outlook on the drivers and methods used in fradulent 'research' - well worth reading.

Frey also deals with the issue of grade inflation and courses overproliferation that can lead to reduced standards of teaching, research and general public good inquiry. "The high reputation of a university is a public good shared by all professors and students, but it is undermined by having too many students of lower quality."

In my view - this is an excellent paper that is worth reading for anyone concerned with the nature of learning and discovery as well as broader concept of academia in our modern society. It is strongly polemical, provocative and certainly deserves a deeper debate.

But let me add to Frey's concerns - based on personal experieince - modern academia, in pursuit of quantitive (teaching & research) targets has lost much of its real societal relevance. Vast majority of senior faculty members are withdrawn from broader social and scientific debate, residing in their own isolated towers of specialist knowledge. This problem is most acute in social sciences, where the unwritten and often unspoken rules for younger faculty are:
  • Don't engage in political, social and economic policy debates outside academic research,
  • Don't engage with broader community outside the walls of academia.
As a young academic, I was told on numerous occasions that writing in press is 'below academic standards', that speaking at non-academic conferences 'doesn't earn one any credit within the University walls', that 'peers don't look kindly on those who disagree with their philosophies in public', etc. The victim in all of this will be the entire academia, which is at a risk of ceasing to be “the locus of seeking truth" risks becoming a Faculty of Useless Knowledge, irrelevant to the society.

Monday, July 19, 2010

Economics 19/7/10: Urban growth, education & knowledge intensive services - part 2

In the previous post (here) on the issues of growth, education and knowledge intensive sectors, I showed that
  • There is a strong positive resilience in income per capita levels across urban economies, with almost 94% of variation in income per capita in 2007 being associated with the variation in income per capita found in 1999. This strong persistency in GDP levels over time implies there is only a weak (but positive) relationship between the past and the future growth rates.
  • Data also shows that there is a weak positive relationship between long term growth in education and long term growth in income per capita. Growth in education between 1999 and 2007 was able to explain just 0.54% of the overall variation in growth in income per capita across various regions.
  • However, over time, the relationship between the levels of education of the workforce and the levels income per capita is becoming stronger both in terms of education impact and the overall explanatory power as to the direct positive correlation between education and income. By 2007 over 14.5% of variation in income per capita across major urban regions was explained by variations in education, up from 7.3% in 1999. If in 1999 1% increase in the proportion of population with 3rd level education was associated with a USD336.53 increase in income per capita (PPP-adjusted), by 2007 this effect rose to USD730.92.
  • Lagged period education levels were shown to be a better determinant of income per capita than contemporaneous levels of education, which suggests that causality flows from education to growth, rather than the other way around.

Chart 7 below explores the relationship between the levels of education in the labour force and two core higher value added sectors of economy: high tech manufacturing (HTM) and knowledge intensive services (KIS).

Chart 7
Consider the blue and the red lines. More educated workforce, it seems, is negatively correlated with high tech manufacturing role in the economy. And this correlation is becoming more negative over time (with lags). In other words, an urban centre that started with highly educated workforce in 1999 is more likely to see declining share of its economic activity accruing to HTM in 2007.

This can be related to the changes in manufacturing that took place over the last two decades, with manufacturing in general becoming increasingly more capital intensive. It is also likely to be due to the fact that with greater outsourcing of core activities and greater offshoring of manufacturing, much of higher value added activities related to high tech manufacturing, such as design and development, and marketing of new products, is now classed separately as services, and geographically removed from manufacturing activities, despite being physically embodied in the value of manufactured goods.

The opposite is true of the relationship between education levels of the workforce and knowledge intensive services role in the economy, although the positive correlation here is not becoming stronger over time (orange and green lines).

Knowledge economics – at least as proxied by education levels – is about the positive role of education in services, but it is not about the links between high-tech manufacturing and education. The dumber is your workforce (in extremely simplistic terms), the higher will be the importance of HTM to your economy… or so it appears…

Chart 8
A look at contemporaneous data reported in the chart above also confirms the previous chart 7 conclusions.

What is even more interesting here are the slopes of the two relationships.

First, the negative correlation between the degree of workforce education and high-tech manufacturing (HTM) had become more negative, from -0.1032 in 1999 to -0.1633 in 2007, while the overall relationship has strengthened (R2 = 0.0836 back in 1999 to R2=0.2341 in 2007).

This relationship is very robust and shows relatively less dispersion in the data than the relationship between education and knowledge intensive sectors.

Second, the slope of the positive relationship between the degree of workforce education and knowledge intensive sectors (KIS) has become weaker over time (from 0.5961, R2 = 0.3104 to 0.3877, R2 = 0.1396).

This result is surprising. Are we hitting diminishing returns to education in terms of increasing importance of KIS in the economy? Or are we simply at the flatter end of asymptotic KIS growth curve with much of knowledge economy already in place so that new education yields lower marginal returns? Alternatively, this might suggest that education is an imperfect instrument for skills and talent and that today, skills and talent gained outside formal classrooms matter more than before.

Finally, it is also worth noting that KIS results are significantly impacted by three observations which tend to drag the slope of the relationship down somewhat. The three, however, do not appear to represent statistically significant outliers.

Another striking relationship is shown in chart 9 below. Greater importance of high-tech manufacturing in the economy is associated with lower GDP per capita, and this negative relationship is strengthening over time, both in the explanatory power and in the size of overall negative effect. This again illustrates, most likely, the growth in capital-intensity of high tech manufacturing and disembodiment of the services-related components of high-tech manufacturing (such as R&D etc).

Chart 9
Lags in data confirm the above conclusion.

Chart 10
Chart 10 shows that identical conclusions to those presented in Chart 9 are warranted when we look at the lagged structure of economy with respect to high-tech manufacturing role in overall economic activity, so that regions that started (back in 1999) with greater share of HTM in overall economy tended to have lower GDP per capita 9 years later.

Lastly, unlike High-Tech Manufacturing, Knowledge Intensive Services are strongly positively correlated with GDP per capita, as shown in chart 11 below. This relationship is true for contemporaneous correlations and for the lagged one. And it is increasing in strength (slopes) over time, as well as in statistical significance. Furthermore, between 1999 and 2007 there has been an acceleration in the strengthening of the relationship. Finally, it is worth noting that lagged role of KIS in economy is almost as strong as 2007 contemporaneous relationship, suggesting that there is significant persistence in the positive effect that KIS have on overall income per capita.

Chart 11.


So let me summarize the main results:
  1. There is a weak positive relationship between long term growth in education and long term growth in income per capita between 1999 and 2007 across various regions.
  2. Over time, the relationship between the levels of education of the workforce and the levels income per capita is becoming stronger both in terms of education impact and the overall explanatory power as to the direct positive correlation between education and income
  3. Lagged levels of education are a better determinant of income per capita than contemporaneous levels of education, which suggests that causality flows from education to growth, rather than the other way around.
  4. More educated workforce is negatively correlated with the importance of high tech manufacturing in the economy. This correlation is becoming more negative over time (with lags).
  5. The relationship between education levels of the workforce and the importance of the knowledge intensive services role in the economy is positive. This positive correlation is not increasing over time.
  6. Overall, knowledge economy – as far as it is captured by third level education – is positively linked to services, and negatively linked to high-tech manufacturing.
  7. The negative correlation between the degree of workforce education and the extent of the high-tech manufacturing (HTM) in overall economy had become even more negative between 1999 and 2007.
  8. The positive relationship between the degree of workforce education and knowledge intensive sectors (KIS) has become weaker over 1999-2007 period.
  9. Greater importance of high-tech manufacturing in the economy is associated with lower GDP per capita, and this negative relationship is strengthening over time, both in the explanatory power and in the size of overall negative effect.
  10. Regions that started (back in 1999) with greater share of HTM in overall economy tended to have lower GDP per capita 9 years later.
  11. Knowledge Intensive Services are strongly positively correlated with GDP per capita. This relationship is true for contemporaneous correlations and for the lagged one.
  12. The positive correlation between income and KIS is increasing in strength (slopes) over time, as well as in statistical significance.

Note: you won’t be able to read this anywhere else – the two blog posts on urban economies, knowledge, education and the roles of high tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive services is an exclusive, just for the readers of this blog…