Showing posts with label Russian banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russian banks. Show all posts

Friday, July 6, 2018

6/7/18: Central Bank of Russia Injects Capital in Three Lenders, Continues Sector Restrcturing


Reuters reported (https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-banks/russian-c-bank-says-to-deposit-2-8-bln-at-otkritie-trust-and-rost-idUSR4N1TT00E) on Central Bank of Russia (CBR) setting up a 'bad bank' to resolve non-performing assets in three medium- large-sized banks that CBR controls. In 2016, the CBR took over control over three medium- large-sized banks, Otkritie, B&N Bank and Promsvyazbank. Last month, the CBR announced an injection of RB 42.7 billion of funds to recapitalise Otkritie with funds earmarked to cover losses in Otkritie's pension fund.  Most Bank received RB37.1 billion in new capital. The CBR also deposited RB 174.2 billion (USD2.78 billion) in three banks (RB63.3 billion of which went to Otkritie) on a 3-5 years termed deposit basis.

The funds will be used to reorganise banks operations and shift non-performing and high risk assets to a Trust Bank-based 'bad bank' which will operate as an asset management company.

After divesting bad loans, Otkritie is expected to be sold back to private investors.

CBR's total exposure to troubled banks is now at RB 227 billion (USD3.5 billion), with CBR having spent RB 760 billion (USD 12 billion) on its overall campaign to recapitalise troubled lenders. CBR holds RB 1.3 trillion (USD30 billion) on deposit with lenders it controls.

As BOFIT note: "...the CBR to date has used over 45 billion USD (about 3% of 2017 GDP) in supporting the three banks that it took over last year. Some of this amount, however, should be recovered when assets in banks acquired by the CBR are sold off as well as in the planned privatisations of the banks." At the beginning of June, Otkritie stated that the bank aims to float a 15-20% stake in 2021. The bank said t's target for pricing will be "at least 1.3 times the capital the bank has at the end of 2020". Otkritie targets return on equity of 18% in 2020, and so far, in the first five months of 2018, the bank made RB 5.4 billion in net profit, per CBR.

Otkritie ranked sixth largest bank in Central and Eastern Europe by capitalisation by The Banker in 2017 prior to nationalisation. Following nationalisation, Otkritie ranked 16th in CEE, having lost some USD2.4 billion in capital.

Another lender, Sovetsky bank from Saint Petersburg lost its license on July 3. The bank gas been in trouble since February 2012 when the CBR approved its first plans for restructuring. In February 2018, the bank was in a "temporary administration" through the Banking Sector Consolidation Fund. The latest rumours suggest that Sovetsky deposits and loans assets will retransferred to another lender.  Sovetsky was under original administration by another lender, Tatfondbank, from March 2016, until Tatfondbank collapsed in March 2017 (official CBR statement https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/PR/?file=03032017_105120eng2017-03-03T10_47_12.htm, and see this account of criminal activity at the Tatfondbank: https://en.crimerussia.com/financialcrimes/collapse-of-tatfondbank-robert-musin-siphoned-off-funds-from-state-owned-bank/ and https://en.crimerussia.com/financialcrimes/tatfondbank-officially-collapses/). Tatfondbank's tangible connection to Ireland's IFSC was covered here: https://realnoevremya.com/articles/1292-tatfondbank-raised-60-million-via-obscure-irish-company-just-before-collapse.

Overall, CBR have done as good a job of trying to clean up Russian banking sector mess, as feasible, with criminal proceedings underway against a range of former investors and executives. The cost of the CBR-led resolution and restructuring actions has been rather hefty, but the overall outrun has been some moderate strengthening of the sector, hampered by the tough trading conditions for Russian banking sector as a whole. A range of U.S. and European sanctions against Russian financial institutions and, more importantly, constant threat of more sanctions to come have led to higher funding costs, more acute risks profiles, lack of international assets diversification, and even payments problems, all of which reduce the banking sector ability to recover low quality and non-performing assets. The CBR has zero control over these factors.

Russia currently has 6 out of top 10 banks in CEE, according to The Banker rankings:


Source: http://www.thebanker.com/Banker-Data/Banker-Rankings/Top-1000-World-Banks-Russian-banks-mixed-fortunes-influence-CEE-ranking?ct=true.

These banks are systemic to the Russian economy, and only the U.S. sabre rattling is holding them back from being systemic in the broader CEE region. This is a shame, because opening up a banking channel to Russian economy greater integration into the global financial flows is a much more important bet on the future of democratisation and normalisation in Russia than any sanctions Washington can dream up.
 


As an aside, new developments in the now infamous Danske Bank case of laundering 'blood money' from Russia, relating to the Magnitzky case were reported this week in the EUObserver: https://euobserver.com/foreign/142286.

Friday, September 29, 2017

28/9/17: Pimco on Russian Economy: My Take


An interesting post about the Russian economy, quite neatly summarising both the top-line challenges faced and the resilience exhibited to-date via Pimco: https://blog.pimco.com/en/2017/09/Russia%20Growth%20Up%20Inflation%20Down. Worth a read.

My view: couple of points are over- and under-played somewhat.

Sanctions: these are a thorny issue in Moscow and are putting pressure on Russian banks operations and strategic plans worldwide. While they do take secondary seat after other considerations in public eye, Moscow insiders are quite discomforted by the effective shutting down of the large swathes of European markets (energy and finance), and North American markets (finance, technology and personal safe havens). On the latter, it is worth noting that a number of high profile Russian figures, including in pro-Kremlin media, have in recent years been forced to shut down shell companies previously operating in the U.S. and divest out of real estate assets. Sanctions are also geopolitical thorns in terms of limiting Moscow's ability to navigate the European policy space.

Banks: this issue is overplayed. Bailouts and shutting down of banks are imposing low cost on the Russian economy and are bearable, as long as inflationary pressures remain subdued. Moscow can recapitalise the banks it wants to recapitalise, so all and any banks that do end up going to the wall, e.g. B&N and Otkrytie - cited in the post - are going to the wall for a different reason. That reason is consolidation of the banking sector in the hands of state-owned TBTF banks that fits both the Central Bank agenda and the Kremlin agenda. The CBR has been on an active campaign to clear out medium- and medium-large banks out of the way both from macroprudential point of view (these institutions have been woefully undercapitalised and exposed to serious risks on assets side), and the financial system stability point of view (majority of these banks are parts of conglomerates with inter-linked and networked systems of loans, funds transfers etc).

Yurga, another bank that was stripped of its license in late July - is the case in point, it was part of a real estate and oil empire. B&N is another example: the bank was a part of the Safmar group with $34 billion worth of assets, from oil and coal to pension funds.

The CBR knowingly tightened the screws on these types of banks back in January:

  • The new rules placed a strict limit on bank’s exposure to its own shareholders - maximum of 20% of its capital, forcing the de-centralisation of equity holdings in banking sector; and
  • Restricted loans to any single borrower or group of connected borrowers to no more than 25% of total lending.
I cannot imagine that analysts covering Russian markets did not understand back in January that these rules will spell the end of many so-called 'pocket' banks linked to oligarchs and their business empires.

The balance of the banking sector is feeling the pain, but this pain is largely contained within the sector. Investment in Russian economy, usually heavily dependent on the banks loans, has been sluggish for a number of years now, but the key catalyst to lifting investment will be VBR's monetary policy and not the state of the banking sector. 

Here is a chart from Reuters summarising movements in interbank debt levels across the top 20 banks:


The chart suggests that net borrowing is rising amongst the top-tier banks, alongside deposits gains (noted by Pimco), so the core of the system is picking up strength off the weaker banks and is providing liquidity. Per NYU's v-lab data, both Sberbank and VTB saw declines in systemic risk exposures in August, compared to July. So overall, the banking system is a problem, but the problem is largely contained within the mid-tier banks and the CBR is likely to have enough fire power to sustain more banks going through a resolution. 


Friday, April 22, 2016

22/4/16: Russian Economy: Renewed Signs of Pressure

Earlier this week, I posted my latest comprehensive deck covering Russian economy prospects for 2016-2017 (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/04/20416-russian-deck-update-april-2016.html). Key conclusion from that data was that Russian economy is desperately searching for a domestic growth catalyst and not finding one to-date.

Today, we have some new data out showing there has been significant deterioration in the underlying economic conditions in the Russian economy and confirming my key thesis.

As reported by BOFIT, based on Russian data, “Russian economy has shrunk considerably from
early 2015. Seasonally adjusted figures show a substantial recovery in industrial output in the first three months of this year. Extractive industries, particularly oil production, drove that growth with production in the extractive sector rising nearly 3.5 % y-o-y. Seasonally adjusted manufacturing output remained rather flat in the first quarter with output down more than 3 % y-o-y.”

As the result, “the economy ministry estimates GDP declined slightly less than 2% y-o-y in 1Q16. Adjusting for the February 29 “leap day,” the fall was closer to 2.5%.”

Meanwhile, domestic demand remained under pressure. Seasonally adjusted volume of retail sales fell 5.5% y/y and is now down 12% on same period in 2014. “Real household incomes contracted nearly 4% y-o-y. Driven by private sector wage hikes, nominal wages rose 6 % y-o-y, just a couple of percentage points less than the pace of 12-month inflation.”

A handy chart:


Oil and gas production, however, continued to boom:



What’s happening? “Russian crude oil output was up in January-March by 4.5% y-o-y to record levels. Under Russia’s interpretation of the proposed production freeze to January levels, it could increase oil output this year by 1.5‒2%. The energy ministry just recently estimated that growth of output this year would only reach 0.5‒1%, which is quite in line with the latest estimate of the International Energy Agency (IEA). However, Russia’s energy ministry expects Russian oil exports to increase 4‒6% this year as domestic oil consumption falls.”

It is worth noting that the signals of a renewed pressure on economic growth side have been present in advanced data for some time now.

Two charts below show Russian (and other BRIC) Manufacturing and Services PMIs:




Both indicate effectively no recovery in the two sectors in 1Q 2016. While Services PMI ended 1Q 2016 with a quarterly average reading of 50.0 (zero growth), marking second consecutive quarter of zero-to-negative growth in the sector, Manufacturing PMI posted average reading of 49.1, below the 50.0 zero growth line and below already contractionary 49.7 reading for 4Q 2015.

Russia’s composite quarterly reading is at 49.9 for 1Q 2016 an improvement on 4Q 2015 reading of 49.1, but still not above 50.0.

In simple terms, the problem remains even though its acuteness might have abated somewhat.

Sunday, April 10, 2016

10/4/16: Russian Bonds Issuance: Some Recent Points of Pressure


Catching up with some data from past few weeks over a number of post and starting with some Russian data.

First, March issue of Russian bonds. The interesting bit relating RUB22.8 billion issuance was less the numbers, but the trend on issuance and issuance underwriting.

First, bid cover was more than four times the amount of August 2021 bonds on offer, raising RUB22.8 billion ($337 million) across
  • fixed-rate notes (bids amounted to RUB47 billion on RUB11.5 billion of August 2021 bonds on offer)
  • floating-rate notes (bids amounted to RUB25 billion on issuance of RUB9.33 billion of December 2017 floating coupon paper) and 
  • inflation-linked securities (amounting to RUB2.01 billion)
This meant that Russia covered in one go 90 percent of its planned issuance for 1Q 2016, as noted by Bloomberg at the time - the highest coverage since 2011. With this, the Finance Ministry will aim to sell RUB270 billion in the 2Q 2016.

Bloomberg provided a handy chart showing as much:


Now, in 2011, Russian economy was still at the very beginning of a structural slowdown period and well ahead of any visibility of sanctions.

Sanctions are not directly impacting sales of Russian Government bonds, but the U.S. has consistently applied pressure on American and European banks attempting to prevent them from underwriting Moscow's Government issues (http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-warns-banks-off-russian-bonds-1456362124). Prior to the auction, Moscow invited 25 Western banks and 3 domestic banks to bid for USD3 billion worth of Eurobonds (the first issuance of Eurobonds by Russia since 2013). Despite the EU official statement that current sanctions regime does not prohibit purchases or sales of Government bonds, Western banks took to the hills (at least officially).

The point of the U.S. pressure on the European banks is a simple threat: in recent years, the U.S. regulators have aggressively pursued European banks for infringements on sanctions against Iran and other activities. In effect, U.S. regulatory enforcement has been used to establish Washington's power point over European banking institutions. And the end game was that, despite being legal, sale of Eurobonds was off limits for BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and UBS, not to mention U.S.-based Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo.

Another dimension of pressure is the denomination of the Eurobond. Moscow wanted Eurobond issued in dollars. However, dollar-issuance requires settlement via the U.S., enhancing U.S. authorities power to exercise arbitrary restriction on a deal that is legal under the U.S. laws (as not being officially covered by sanctions).

Beyond underwriters, even buy-side for Russian Government bonds is being pressured, primarily by the U.S., with a range of European and American investment funds getting hammered: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-24/russia-loses-buyside-support-for-eurobond-after-banks-balk.

Russian Government bonds (10 year benchmark) are trading at around 9.26-9.3 percent yield range, well down on December 2014 peak of over 14.09 percent, but still massively above bonds for countries with comparable macroeconomic performance statistics.



Interestingly, there is a huge demand in the market for Russian Eurobonds, as witnessed by mid-March issuance by Gazprom of bonds denominated in CHF (see: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-16/gazprom-taps-switzerland-with-russia-s-first-eurobond-this-year).

It is worth noting again that Russian Government bonds are not covered by any sanctions and are completely legal to underwrite and transact in.

Beyond this, the Western sanctions were explicitly designed to avoid placing financial pressures on ordinary Russians. Government bonds are used to fund general Government deficits arising from all lines of Government expenditure, including healthcare, social welfare, education etc, but also including military spending, while excluding supports for sanctioned enterprises and banks (the latter line of expenditure is linked to funds being sourced from the SWF reserves). Given this, the U.S. position on bonds issuance represents a potential departure from the U.S.-stated objective of sanctions and can be interpreted as an attempt to directly induce pain on ordinary Russians (the more vulnerable segments of the population, such as the elderly, children and those in need of healthcare, or as they are termed in Russian - budgetniki - those whose incomes depend on the Budgetary allocations).

This is a sad turn of events from markets and U.S. policy perspectives - placing arbitrary and extra-legal restrictions on transactions that are perfectly legal is not a good policy basis, unless the U.S. objective is to fully politicise financial markets in general. Neither is the U.S. position consistent with the ethical stance de jure adopted under the sanctions regime.

Tuesday, February 23, 2016

23/2/16: Moody's on Russian Banks & Ruble


A recent Moody's report on Russian banks makes an interesting point, linking capital buffers in the banking system to ruble valuations

Per Moody's: "We expect Russian banks' capital ratios and loan performance to bear the brunt of the country's falling currency and economic contraction. We also envisage a detrimental impact on bank profitability as rising problem loans will likely lead to higher loan-loss provisioning expenses for banks."

The rouble dropped a further 3% in January 2016, after falling 23% versus the dollar in the second half of 2015. At the same time, the Russian economy contracted by 4% real GDP for 2015 and Moody's forecasts further GDP contraction of at least 2% in 2016.

By Moody's estimate, "close to a third of the banking sector's loan book is denominated in foreign currency and the falling rouble will likely inflate the value of these loans in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital ratio) pushing it higher and, consequently, capital ratios lower. Without accounting for additional loan growth, a 10% rouble devaluation could lead to a 30 basis point negative impact on capital ratios..."

This is not as dramatic as the headline risks occupying Moody's, but material. Worse, this risk is coincident with the broader recessionary pressures on Russian banks. Thus, "Moody's expects the recession, with the added burden of currency depreciation, to lead to rising problem loans for Russia's banks. The rating agency estimates the stock of nonperforming and impaired loans in the banking system to rise to 14%-16% over the next 12 months, from an estimated 11% as of year-end 2015."

The third coincident factor is the Central Bank policy space: "Currency depreciation may also prevent the Central Bank of Russia from lowering its key interest rates (currently at 11%), which sets the benchmark and influences the rates which banks pay for customer deposits and the rates at which they borrow on the interbank market."

Final pressure point for the banks is deposits composition "...if corporate and retail depositors decide to protect themselves from the falling currency and switch to FX deposits. Trends so far show rouble deposits stagnating while FX deposits have increased. The percentage of FX deposits to total deposits rose to 39% as at end of December 2015, compared to 29% as at end of March 2014."

March-December comparative is significant, as it sheds some light on longer term trends beyond December 2014 - March 2015 period when forex deposits of major corporates were driven down on the foot of Moscow urging de-dollarization of the deposits base, reducing cash reserves held in forex to January 2015 levels.

Sunday, January 10, 2016

10/1/16: Russian Banks: Licenses Cancellations Galore


Why Russian Central Bank’s chief Elvira Nabiullina deserves title of the best central banker she got in 2015? Why, because she sticks to her stated objectives and goes on even in challenging conditions.

When Nabiullina came to office, Russian banking system was besieged by underperforming and weak banks - mostly at the bottom of banking sector rankings, but with some at the very top too (see ongoing VEB saga here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2016/01/1116-another-veb-update-things-are.html). And she promised a thorough clean up of the sector. I wrote about that before (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/22122014-elvira-nabiullina-roubles-last.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/1432013-comment-of-appointment-of-new.html).

But times have been tough for such reforms, amidst credit tightening, rising arrears and economic crisis. Again, majority of the problems are within the lower tier banks, but numbers of loss-making institutions has been climbing over 2015. January-November 2015 data shows that almost 30% of Russian banks are running operating losses and overdue loans have risen by nearly 50% to RUB2.63 trillion. Still, this constitutes less than 7 percent of total credit outstanding. Stressed (but not necessarily overdue) loans rose from 7 percent of total credit in January 2015 to 8 percent at the end of December 2015. Notably, both stressed and overdue loans numbers are surprisingly low. And on another positive side, bank’s own capital to assets ratio averaged 13 percent. The aggregate numbers conceal quite some variation within the banking sector, as noted by Bofit: “At the beginning of November, 129 banks had equity ratios below 12%. Large deficiencies in calculating the capital have come to light in several bank insolvencies.”

Amidst this toughening of trading conditions, CBR continued to push our weaker banks from the market. Over 2015, 93 banks lost their licenses, almost the same number as in 18 months prior with just 740 banks left trading the market as of December 2015. As the result, banking sector concentration rose, with 20 largest banks now holding 75 percent share of the market by assets. In January-October 2015, some 600,000 depositors in Russian banks were moved from banks losing licenses to functioning banks, per report here.

Chart from Bofit illustrates the trends in terms of banking licenses revoked:


Overall, this is good news. Russian banking system evolved - prior to 2009 - into a trilateral system of banks, including strong larger (universal) banks, medium-sized specialist and foreign banks with retail exposures, weak and sizeable fringe of smaller institutions, often linked to industrial holding companies. Aside from VEB - which officially is not a bank - larger banks are operating in tough conditions, but remain relatively robust. Smaller banks, however, having relied in previous years on higher risk consumer credit and holding, often, lower quality capital, have been impacted by the crisis and by the lack of liquidity. Shutting these operations down and consolidating the smaller banks' fringe is something that Russian needs anyway. 

Wednesday, December 23, 2015

23/12/15: Vnesheconombank: where things stay ugly


As reported by BOFIT, Russia’s 4th largest and state-owned Vnesheconombank  (VEB Group which technically is not a bank, but a development bank and an owner of a number of banks, so as such VEB is not subject to CBR supervision) requires estimated funding supports at EUR15–20 billion “to cover at least the next few years”.  Per Bloomberg, VEB has been seeking USD23 billion “to support long-term growth and pay off the upcoming loan” (data as of November 23). VEB total assets in Russia amount to ca EUR45 billion, which, per BOFIT, “would make VEB Russia’s fourth largest bank with holdings that correspond to about 4 % of the banking sector’s total assets”. Overall, VEB holds 2.8 trillion Rubles in loans assets and around 1 trillion Rubles in other assets.

To-date, VEB received EUR8 billion in deposits from the National Welfare Fund and about EUR500 million in other monies (most of which came from the Central Bank’s 2014 profits).

Per both, Bloomberg and BOFIT: VEB has been a major lender behind Sochi Winter Olympics 2014. New lending increased total loans held by the bank by some 25% in Ruble terms in 2013 before doubling loans in 2014. VEB started aggressive loans expansion in 2007 since when its assets base grew almost 10-fold. Over 2015, bank-held loans posted some serious deterioration in quality forcing bank to set aside significant reserves to cover potential losses. Per Reuters report, “S&P estimates some 500 billion roubles of VEB's loans were directed by the government and are therefore regarded as relatively risky. While the huge investments made in Sochi have generated public discussion in Russia, far less attention has been given to no less massive investments VEB made in Ukraine. "That's still on their books and they keep rolling those loans over. Of course it's only a question of time before they accept losses on those assets," said S&P's Vartapetov. In an interview in December 2013, VEB Chairman Vladimir Dmitriev said the bank had via Russian investors ploughed $8 billion into Ukrainian steel plants, mainly in the Donbass region, since ravaged in a separatist conflict. He said the investment had supported 40,000 Ukrainian workers, but did not say how the Russian economy had benefited.” Overall, Russian banks’ continued presence and even growth in Ukraine - while puzzling to some external observers - can be explained by the significant role these banks play in the Ukrainian economy.

In 2014, VEB posted full year loss of USD4.5 billion / RUB250 billion and in 1H 2015 losses totalled USD1.5 billion. VEB’s Ukrainian subsidiary was one of the big drivers for these. Based on the figures, VEB posted the largest loss of any Russian company in 2014.  The top three largest loss making companies in 2014 were: Vnesheconombank, followed by the steelmaking giant Mechel (loss of 167 billion rubles) and the monopoly Russian Railways (losses of 99 billion rubles).

In addition, VEB holds some USD19.3 billion of debt maturing through 2025 (see chart from Bloomberg) with EUR9 billion of this in eurobonds:



VEB is subject to both EU and US sanctions which effectively shut VEB access to funding markets and the bank will require between EUR2.5 and 3 billion for debt servicing in 2016 alone. This week, VEB secured a five-year loan of 10 billion yuan or EUR1.4 billion from China Development Bank.

Recently, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated that VEB requires as much as USD20 billion in funding (ca 1.7% of Russian GDP), and that VEB is expected to sell some of its assets to fund part of the gap.


Per Bloomberg, “the finance ministry’s proposals include exchanging the lender’s Eurobonds for Russian government securities, Vedomosti reported Nov. 24. Other options on the table include a local government bond offering for 1.5 trillion rubles to recapitalize the bank, and transferring bad assets from VEB’s balance sheet to the state, according to newspaper Kommersant.”

Saturday, August 15, 2015

15/8/15: Russian External Debt: Big Deleveraging, Smaller Future Pressures


Readers of this blog would have noted that in the past I referenced Russian companies cross-holdings of own debt in adjusting some of the external debt statistics for Russia. As I explained before, large share of the external debt owed by banks and companies is loans and other debt instruments issued by their parents and subsidiaries and direct equity investors - in other words, it is debt that can be easily rolled over or cross-cancelled within the company accounts.

This week, Central Bank of Russia did the same when it produced new estimate for external debt maturing in September-December 2015. The CBR excluded “intra-group operations” and the new estimate is based on past debt-servicing trends and a survey of 30 largest companies.

As the result of revisions, CBR now estimates that external debt coming due for Russian banks and non-financial corporations will be around USD35 billion, down on previously estimated USD61 billion.

CBR also estimated cash and liquid foreign assets holdings of Russian banks and non-bank corporations at USD135 billion on top of USD20 billion current account surplus due (assuming oil at USD40 pb) and USD14 billion of CBR own funds available for forex repo lending.

Here are the most recent charts for Russian external debt maturity, excluding most recent update for corporate and banks debt:



As the above table shows, in 12 months through June 2015, Russian Total External Debt fell 24%, down USD176.6 billion - much of it due to devaluation of the ruble and repayments of maturing debt. Of this, Government debt is down USD22.1 billion or 39% - a huge drop. Banks managed to deleverage out of USD59.9 billion in 12 months through June 2015 (down 29%) and Other Sectors external liabilities were down USD88.8 billion (-20%).

These are absolutely massive figures indicating:
1) One of the underlying causes of the ongoing economic recession (contracting credit supply and debt repayments drag on investment and consumer credit);
2) Strengthening of corporate and banks' balance sheets; and
3) Overall longer term improvement in Russian debt exposures.


Thursday, August 6, 2015

6/8/15: IMF Assessment of Russian Banks & Financial Markets


Alongside the Article IV (covered in three posts all linked here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2015/08/3815-imf-on-russian-economy-private.html), the IMF also released a series of technical papers, including one on the state of health of the Russian financial markets.

Top-level conclusion: "using a comprehensive index of financial development, to identify potential bottlenecks", the study "…finds that Russia’s financial markets are relatively deep, accessible and efficient, but that financial institutions, in particular banks, have much to do to improve their efficiency and create further depth. Russia could potentially gain up to 1 percentage point in GDP growth on average over the medium-term from further deepening and efficiency improvements. Policies towards this outcome include reducing banking sector fragmentation through consolidation via increased supervision and tightening capital standards; strengthening the role of credit bureaus and collateral registries to reduce information asymmetries; and removal of interest rate rigidities to foster competition."

Specifically, one key bottleneck is the distribution of sources for finance: "Russian companies rely much less on external financing in general and on bank financing in particular, to finance investment compared to their peers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia or in their upper middle income group. Typically, internal resources, state funds and controlling entities are responsible for financing up to 80 percent of business investment. As a result, banks contribute only 6 percent of funding for business investment, with the bulk of investment financed from retained earnings."

Couple of charts



Now, one can agree with IMF on the need for Russian companies to tap more diversified investment channels, but one has to also observe two key risks inherent in this suggestion:

  1. Debt levels overall are low in Russian economy, and much of these are accumulated in controlling entities relations with enterprises - in other words - linked to equity and direct investment. This is good, as this allows enterprises more flexibility and better management opportunities with respect to cash flow and business activity;
  2. Low debt levels also allow for absorption of political shocks that we are witness gin today, arising from political shutting down of Russian companies access to Western funding markets. If Russia is to retain meaningful risk buffers, accessing external finance via bond markets and equity markets abroad saddles Russian entities with higher risk of external shocks.


So IMF can propose, but I seriously doubt Russian companies will be rushing to borrow at a breakneck speed any time soon.

IMF uses a relatively new framework for assessment of the financial sector environment, the concept of financial development. "Financial development is defined as a combination of:

  • Depth (size and liquidity of markets), 
  • Access (ability of individuals to access financial services), and 
  • Efficiency (ability of institutions to provide financial services at low cost and with sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets)."




So IMF main conclusion is quite surprising for those not familiar with Russian markets: "Russia’s financial markets are relatively developed but financial institutions lag behind in terms of efficiency and depth."

"Russia’s FD index (0.58) is higher than the average EM (0.37) and slightly lower than the average BTICS (0.64), a group of countries composed of Brazil, Turkey, India, China, and South Africa. …Russia scores much higher than the comparator groups for FM developments [Financial Markets development] as it features higher degrees of access and efficiency in the operations of its financial markets. Although the depth of financial markets is slightly lower than BTICS countries, it remains much higher than the average EM."

Big bottleneck is in financial depth, where "…financial institutions in Russia are comparatively dominated by the banking system, with fewer to non-existent assets, in percent of GDP, in pension funds, mutual funds and insurance industry. Moreover, the banking system lacks depth with domestic credit at about 50 percent of GDP being the lowest in the BTICS group."


Why? "With some 850 banks operating, the Russian banking system is highly concentrated at the top, and fragmented at the bottom":

  • "The top three banks (state-owned) accounted for more than 50 percent of total sector assets at year-end 2014 while the top 20 banks accounted for 75 percent of total sector assets."
  • "Lending is highly concentrated among the top 10 bank groups making about 850 banks contribute only 15 percent of total lending."
  • "…VTB Group alone with 16 percent share of lending accounts for a similar share as the 830 remaining banks."
  • "Most of the banks are small and act as treasury accounts for local firms, operating in particular in mono-cities."

This "…undermines lending to companies and SMEs as their ability to both extend credit and diversify across companies is limited while lending to consumers is usually the dominant form of credit."


What is there to be done to get Russian banking and financial systems up to speed?

IMF benchmarks the potential scope of reforms against the absolute best scenario (not scenario consistent with other comparative economies), which makes things sound quite a bit optimistic, or unrealistic. The menu is predictable and relatively straightforward:

  • Cut the number of banks without impacting degree of competition. Which is easy to say, hard to achieve, and at any rate, Russian authorities have been doing as much, albeit slowly, for a good part of almost 2 years now.
  • Increase supervisory pressures to remove even more banks out of the active list (again, has been ongoing since 2013).
  • Improve quality of collateral registries to lower the cost of collateralisation for SMEs. Which, in part, will also involve improving existent system of credit bureaus.
  • Link deposit rates paid by the banks to the banks' deposit insurance cover. In other words, remove Central Bank restriction on deposit rates quoted by the banks, but replace it with a restriction capping ability of highly risky banks to raise uninsured deposits. Which sounds like a good idea, assuming deposit insurance scheme is fully funded and solvent. Which, in turn, assumes no systemic crisis.
  • Privatise state banks. Which is strange. IMF also notes that "there is no urgent need in Russia for large scale privatization, especially in light of the fragmentary evidence that public banks in Russia are not less efficient than private ones." And the Fund stresses the importance of economies of scale in delivering improved banking sector efficiencies. Which begs a question: what is to be privatised? Large state-owned banks? If they are privatised with a break up, the system will suffer risks to the efficiency. If they are privatised as they are, the system will receive private dominant players in the market which, arguably, will be no different from the state-owned ones in any meaningful way.


As usual for IMF: neat pics, cool stats, a small pinch of useful proposals and a list of predictable ideas that make sense… only if you do not spot their faulty logic…

Monday, August 3, 2015

3/8/15: IMF on Russian Economy: Private Sector Debt


Continuing with IMF analysis of the Russian economy, recall that
- The first post here covered GDP growth projections (upgraded)
- External Debt and Fiscal positions (a mixed bag with broadly positive supports but weaker longer-term sustainability issues relating to deficits).

This time around, let's take a look at IMF analysis of Private Sector Debt.

As IMF notes, economic crisis is weighing pretty heavily on banks' Non-performing Loans:


In part, the above is down to hefty write downs taken by the banks on Ukrainian assets (Russian banks were some of the largest lenders to Ukraine in the past) both in corporate and household sectors.

However, thanks to deleveraging (primarily in the corporate sector, due to sanctions, and some in household sector, due to economic conditions), Loan to Deposits ratio is on the declining trajectory:
Note: Here is a chart on deleveraging of the corporate sector and for Russian banks:


In line with changes in demand for debt redemptions, FX rates, as well as due to some supports from the Federal Government, banks' exposure to Central Bank funding lines has moderated from the crisis peak, though it remains highly elevated:

Illustrating the severity of sanctions, corporate funding from external lenders and markets has been nil:

And Gross External Debt is falling (deleveraging) on foot of cut-off markets and increased borrowing costs:

So companies are heading into domestic markets to borrow (banks - first chart below, bonds - second chart below):


Net:

1) Corporate external debt is falling:

2) Household debt is already low:

3) But the problem is that deleveraging under sanctions is coinciding with economic contraction (primarily driven by lower oil prices), which means that Government reserve funds (while still sufficient) are not being replenished. IMF correctly sees this as a long term problem:

So top of the line conclusion here is that banking sector remains highly pressured by sanctions and falling profitability, as well as rising NPLs. Credit issuance is supported not by new capital formation (investment) but by corporates switching away from foreign debt toward domestic debt. Deleveraging, while long-term positive, is painful for the economy. While the system buffers remain sufficient for now, long term, Russia will require serious changes to fiscal rules to strengthen its reserves buffers over time.