Showing posts with label Irish property markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish property markets. Show all posts

Friday, October 13, 2017

13/10/17: Debt Glut and Building Dublin


Just back from Ireland, a fast, work-filled trip, with some amazing meetings and discussions, largely unrelated to what is in the 'official' newsflow. Some blogposts and articles ahead to be shared.

One thing that jumps out is the continued frenzy in building activity in Dublin, predominantly (exclusively) in the commercial space (offices). Not much finished. Lots being built. For now, Irish builders (mostly strange new players backed by vultures and private equity) are still in the stage where buildings shells are being erected. The cheap stage of construction. Very few are entering the fit-out stages - the costly, skills-intensive works stage. And according to several sector specialists I spoke to, not many fit-out crews are in the market, as skilled builders have not been returning to the island, yet, from their exiles to the U.S., Canada, Australia, UAE, and further afield.

Which should make for a very interesting period ahead: with so many construction sites nearing the fit-out stages, building costs will sky rocket, just as supply glut of new offices will start hitting the letting markets. In the mean time, many multinationals - aka the only clients worth signing - have already signed leases and/or bought own buildings on the cheap. Google owns its own real estate (hello BEPS tax reforms that stress tangible activity over imaginary revenue shifting); Twitter has a refurbished home; Facebook is quite committed to a lease (although it too might take a jump into buying); and so on. Tax inversion have slowed down and Trump Administration just re-committed to Obama-era restrictions on these, while Trump tax plan aims to take a massive chunk out of this pie away from Ireland. So demand... demand is nowhere to be seen.

Will this spell a twin squeeze on office blocks currently hanging around in a pre-weather tight conditions?

The market timing for a lot of this real estate investment is looking shaky. Globally and across Europe, corporates are doing relatively well. But, despite this, there is no investment cycle on the horizon. And revenues growth rates have been sustained by a massive glut of legacy credit sloshing in the international monetary system. Courtesy of Daniel Lacalle @dlacalle_IA, here is a Deutsche Bank chart illustrating what the past monetary excesses have produced:
Three lessons are to be extracted from the above:

  1. Lags in corporate investment activity imply that the current level of demand for hard assets worldwide is driven by the 2016 ultra low borrowing rates; 
  2. Forward corporate investment activity is starting to show the pressure of rising rates and reduced (or even negative) assets purchases by the Central Bankers, with negative rates share of the total debt market shrinking from over USD12 trillion at the end of 2016 to USD8 trillion now; and
  3. The glut of debt continues to rise through 2017, albeit at a slightly slower rate than in 2016.
These points suggest that, barring a new miracle of monetary variety, forward debt financed investment and growth is bound to slow. And the cost of debt carry is bound to rise. Which should be bad news for the European and U.S. debt-funded real estate activity. 

And it will be an even tougher pill to swallow for the crop of new (Nama-linked) Irish developers who were quick in raising hundreds of millions in funding in form of cheap (ultra cheap) debt and frothy equity. Many of these lads have nearly zero experience in building, some are backed by 'experts' from Nama's top cohorts of 'specialists' - the cohorts that were dominated by the pre-bust advisers, not developers. 

The bust is still unlikely at this stage, as majority of current sites that are in mid-stage development have a low acquisition cost, thanks to the fire sales by Nama, and still enjoy a couple of years of cheap debt carry costs. 

But inflation in construction costs will sap whatever wind the housing building sub-sector might have had in it (which is not much, as housing construction is still sitting well behind offices activity). Planning permissions for new housing are languishing sub 1,500 per quarter, comparable to 2010 levels. Planning permissions for ex-residential are at late 2007- early 2008 levels, aka stronger.


In other words, the upcoming cost squeeze is likely to do two things to the Irish market:
  • Cost inflation at fit-outs will probably dent future development activity, instead of creating a large-scale bust; and
  • Commercial development sector will continue pressuring house building, driving up rents and residential property prices.

Friday, January 1, 2016

1/1/16: Developers Questioning Banking Inquiry Report


While we do not know what is in the Banking Inquiry report signed-off this week, concerns being expressed by the two developers, namely Michael O’Flynn and Johnny Ronan, that the report is likely to be a whitewash of Nama is a legitimate one.

The inquiry basically and obviously failed to provide platform for the voices critical (or robustly critical) of Nama, opting instead to put forward testimonies of some developers who have potential coincident / congruent interest in seeing Nama escaping serious criticism.

Thus, legitimate suspicion can be (though we should wait to confirm or decline it) that the Banking Inquiry report will indeed skip over Nama's core role in creating a dysfunctional (and currently strongly legally challenged) crisis resolution environment in Ireland. And another legitimate suspicion (based on past record of coverage of the Inquiry in the media) is that most of Irish media will be unlikely to robustly challenge the report on any conclusions regarding Nama.

That said, let's wait and see the report...


Tuesday, December 8, 2015

8/12/15: Irish Rents: A Longer Term View


Much has been written about the plight of renters in Ireland. Much of it is correct - there have been some atrocious rises in rents, primarily private rents, in recent years. Year on year, in the last 3 months (though October 2015), private rents rose 10.35% against local authority rents falling 1.11% and mortgage interest declining 8.88%. A year ago - over 3mo through October 2014, private rents inflation was running at 8.95% against local authorities rents rising 1.06% and mortgage interest falling 10.26%.

Which makes for a depressing reading for the renters. Actual rents paid by tenants were up 8.83% in 3mo period through October 2015 and they rose 7.93% y/y in the 3mo period through October 2014. So inflation rate in rents is going up.

However, rents inflation has to be taken over the longer period of time. And here, things are not as clear cut as in the short run. Comparable CSO data goes only back to January 2003. So we have no reliable benchmark for earlier periods, albeit some bootstrapped comparatives are possible. As the result, let’s consider 1Q 2003 as the starting point for inflation - with a host of caveats attached.

Setting 1Q 2003 average level of price indices at 100, inflation in overall Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels category that includes rents, mortgages and other housing costs stood at 55.94% in October 2015. Actual rentals paid by tenants over the same period of time were up 26.93%. Private rents rose over 1Q 2003 to October 2015 by 18.62% while local authority rents rose 73.36% and mortgages rose 24.33%.

In other words, cumulated inflation since 1Q 2003 was higher in Local authority rents and mortgage interest than in private rents. Chart below illustrates:



Pretty much the same picture emerges if we take the entire 2003 average (not just 1Q 2003) as a benchmark. In fact, compared to 2003 levels, mortgage interest inflation is just above actual rents paid and is still higher than private rents inflation.

Setting levels aside, let’s take a look at inflation rates (y/y changes in indices). Historical average y/y inflation in Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas & Other fuels category is 4.50% against historical mortgages interest costs inflation of 5.29%, historical private rents inflation of 1.56%, historical local authorities rents inflation of 4.56% and historical inflation in actual rentals paid by tenants of 2.00%.


Once again, timing is everything: given low level of transactions in the purchasing markets for property over the current crisis, majority of mortgage payees today have lived through the period of pre-crisis spike in mortgage costs. Their current savings (reduced cost of mortgages interest) are simply lagged off-sets to this high cost reality of the past. On the other hand, renters faced far lower volatility in rents than mortgagees in mortgage interest. Their current pain is a delayed cost uplift on past moderation in inflation.

Which is, of course, not to say there is less pain because of this or that Irish rental markets are somehow functioning well in terms of pricing. Just to point out that timing of comparatives is important and that one should be careful pitching the (real) pain of Irish renters against the allegedly easy-times for other participants in the markets.

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

17/11/15: Irish Rents: Welcome to More Consumer Whacking by Government


In efficient market, pre-announced policy changes get priced into market valuations before the policy change takes place. This was the case with the Gazprom's Nord Stream pipeline (working paper on this is forthcoming) and this is also true for much more liquid markets for rents.

Behold, Irish Government's latest stab at creating policies-driven evidence (or in other words, screw ups): http://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/property-mortgages/landlords-pile-on-rises-ahead-of-new-rent-controls-34206919.html.

As expected, Irish landlords were quick to price in future freezes in rents in advance of such freezes coming into force. Which means that already beleaguered Irish renters can now pay even more in rents over an even longer time horizon. Double whacking of consumers by the incompetent policy designers continues unabated...

Thursday, July 16, 2015

16/7/15: Nama: The Gift of Giving That Keeps on Giving...


While Greece is limping to its Bailout 3.0, our national heroes at Nama are busy fighting massive (California-sized) forest fires.

The Northern Ireland story (covered on this blog here) is refusing to go away:

  1. An academic legal eagle exposition from the U.S. It's in NYTimes, which is on the 'radar' of all our development agencies (the folks that do have Good Minister's ear to whisper into).
  2. And Irish News is covering the statement issued by Mr. Ian Coulter, the former managing partner of Belfast law firm Tughans. Sluggerotool.com covers same with extra details. Same covered in the Journal.ie piece here.
  3. A good article from the Irish Times on Cerberus (the fund in the middle of Nama's Northern Ireland's case) and its use of Irish companies as vehicles for purchasing some EUR19 billion worth of assets. "Each of the Irish companies owns hundreds of millions, or in some cases billions, of euro in assets but has no employees in Ireland and in some instances, pays no corporation tax here. Cerberus has established at least 10 such companies in Ireland since it started its European property loan shopping spree in 2013, all of which appear to be owned by Promontoria, a Dutch fund that is 100 per cent owned by Cerberus Capital Management." 
  4. Another person in the middle of Norther Irish deal - Mr. Frank Cushnahan was, it appears, a 'serial director' in "over 30 companies" according to this article in the Irish Times. Which, obviously, qualified him to advise Nama.
  5. Deputy Mick Wallace went on to add to the story, claiming that Nama was aware of the suspicious aspects of transaction in the North, 'since January'. Nama categorically denied this.
  6. The UK National Crime Agency will investigate Deputy Wallace's claims.
Meanwhile, back at the foot of this mountain of proverbial... err... at home in Dublin, revelations that our Government appointments to Nama posts could have been... surprise-surprise... political. Who would have thought this much?

There is a documentary trail now to prove that Nama was a party to Government-related discussions about 'fixing' the land market in the Republic. In this, the State's objective of attempting to control the supply of land for development and improve saleability of assets is uncovered and Nama cooperation is identified. Nothing like manipulating the markets as a direct policy objective, folks. We had, of course, back in June this year, Deputy Mick Wallace's allegations that Nama has some unorthodox dealings with the rental sector in Ireland, allegedly "a “cartel” of big property owners had driven up rental costs in Dublin" as “A small group of players now control a large chunk of the rental market in Dublin"... He also said Nama likes to sell properties in big blocks “that only investment funds, vulture funds, mostly from America, have the money to be buying”.

A good old article from Bloomberg archives covering another Nama deal fiasco. The deal was a dodo: Morgan Stanley bought about 220 million pounds of loans to West Properties for "about 65 million pounds ($103 million), or a 70 percent discount". Nama does not sell properties to parties connected to original developers... you know...

And to top it all, we have a new load of revelations from Mick Wallace, TD on further fun-under-the-sun relating to the Holy Grail of Irish Solutions to Irish Problems: the claim made under "Dáil privilege, ... a person in construction who wanted to exit NAMA and was asked to pay €15,000 “in a bag – in cash.”

Wallace also referenced recently the Chicago Spire case (covered earlier here in my compendium of 10 worst deals on Nama's record). A quote: "I would like NAMA to explain its approach when a bidder went to buy not the loans but the debt of the Chicago Spire, which was at $78 million plus costs which brought it to approximately $93 million. An investor sought to buy the debt, and this was every penny that was owed to the bank. This was not the reduced value, but the par value. In other words, this investor was prepared to pay the debt in full but NAMA gave it to Jones Lang LaSalle in New York to sell. This was a site in Chicago. Even if NAMA thought it could get more for it, it was not in New York that it would have got it. It would have been interesting if it had marketed it in Chicago. Why could NAMA not accept the debt being bought out? It is estimated that it was sold for $35 million. NAMA refused $78 million, plus the cost, and it accepted a figure in the region of €35 million. That was claimed to be in the interests of the taxpayer."

It is worth repeating that Nama has denied any wrongdoing in any of the above cases and has now requested that Gardai investigate Deputy Wallace's claims. All other players in the Northern Ireland saga also denied allegations.

Of course, when it comes to Nama asking Gardai to investigate N. Irish deal allegations and denying any knowledge of wrongdoing, without putting their intent and their denial into question, one might recall that Nama is fully aware of another wrongdoing relating to IBRC interest rate overcharging (as detailed and documented here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/11615-full-letter-concerning-ibrc.html). But so far, Nama is in no rush to address the matter it has been notified about some ages ago (see details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/12615-anglo-overcharging-saga-ganley.html). Lest we forget, NAMA was the biggest buyer of the IBRC loans to which the interest overcharging applied, and, it is alleged (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/1062015-bombshell-goes-off-on-anglo.html), this overcharging continued for loans transferred to Nama and still continues, despite the High Court Ruling of October 2014.

Wednesday, December 31, 2014

31/12/2014: Irish Ghost Estates: The March of Zombies


An interesting recent article from the Irish Independent on the sad state of Irish ghost estates: http://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/property-mortgages/work-stopped-on-226-ghost-estates-across-ireland-30856439.html?utm_content=bufferd7e17&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Interesting, from my perspective, not just in the fact that 226 ghost estates saw no work activity in 2014, despite the uplift in property prices and Government prioritising completion of ghost estates. But interesting due to numbers it revealed.

Take a deep breath: seven years after the crisis set in, and nine years after building activity contraction set in, Ireland (a country of 4.8 million inhabitants) still has 992 estates (as in multiple dwellings developments) unfinished. And of these, 776 estates have people residing on the site of abandoned construction. But that is not all, 271 more (on top of 992 above) are not completed, but deemed to have been 'substantially completed' (which can mean pretty much anything).

Good news, 1,854 ghost estates have been completed. Bad news is that the Year Four of Our Government's Recover Turnaround, only 271 ghost estates have been completed, which means that at current rate we are looking at 2017 or later before we are rid of the ghost estates. That is a decade of physical scars reminding us about less than a decade of excesses. Of course, given growth in homelessness, the rising spectre of banks repossessions, the social housing lists explosion and other fine mess, non-physical scars will be with us much longer.

Tuesday, September 2, 2014

2/9/2014: Mortgages in Arrears Down, but Risks Rise


Much has already been highlighted in the latest mortgages arrears data from Ireland for Q2 2014. The Central Bank's full press release is available here: http://www.centralbank.ie/press-area/press-releases/Pages/ResidentialMortgageArrearsandRepossessionsQ22014.aspx

But some things are worth repeating, and a couple of things remain largely unreported. Let's focus on these.

First and foremost, all figures reported talk predominantly about PDH (principal residences) mortgages as distinct from BTL (Buy-to-Let) mortgages. This is fine, but in my view, many of these are inter-connected: same families hold both, securities are inter-linked etc. So I will cover here combined numbers of PDH and BTL loans.

1) At the aggregate level, there were 165,674 mortgages in arrears of any duration at the end of Q2 2014, down 3.44% (-5,904 accounts) on previous quarter. This is the good news. Slightly less impressive news is that the balance of these mortgages in arrears stood at EUR33.629 billion, which represents a decline of only 1.93% q/q (down EUR662.2 million). So the mortgages that remain in arrears are now of larger size on average than before. This, of course, may mean that by sheer accident, easier to repair smaller mortgages are being restructured, but it might also mean that the banks are cherry picking easier mortgages. Which is fine, in the early stages of the workout, but will also mean that things are going to get progressively tougher to resolve in the future.


2) Robust declines in arrears were recorded in mortgages at the lower duration of arrears:

  • Number of mortgages in arrears up to 90 days declined 8.1% to 43,582 (a drop of 3,842 accounts) and their outstanding volume declined in line with the number of accounts - down 8.62% (ERU675.6 million)
  • Number of mortgages in arrears of 91-180 days has fallen also significantly, down 7.88% (-1,378 accounts) and their values also dropped broadly in line with accounts reduction, down 8.26% or EUR266.6 million.


3) Things are a bit tighter with harder to resolve cases of longer duration arrears:

  • Total number of mortgages in arrears over 180 days was down by just 0.64% q/q in Q2 2014 (-684 accounts). Note that repossessions rose by 200, so this suggests that very little restructuring of harder arrears cases is taking place. 
  • Of the above, number of mortgages in arrears 181-360 days was down significantly - q/q down 9.74% or 2,421 accounts but their volume decreased somewhat less, down 8.35% or EUR397.6 million.
  • Mortgages with arrears 361-720 days out have declined 3.82% (-1,269 accounts) which is far lower than declines in shorter arrears mortgages, and the volume of mortgages in arrears in this category fell only 3.02% (down EUR208.2 million) q/q.
  • But the real problem is the increase in mortgages in arrears over 720 days. Despite all the ongoing efforts by the banks to dress up extend-and-pretend solutions to arrears as sustainable and long term, the number of mortgages in most severe distress rose 6.19% q/q up 3,006 accounts and the volume of these mortgages rose 7.64% or EUR884.8 million.
  • As the result of the aforementioned cherry-picking by the banks, mortgages in arrears 91 days as proportion of all mortgages in arrears rose to 73.7% in Q2 2014 from 72.4% in Q1 2014 and 70.1% in Q2 2013.


4) Meanwhile, repossessions rose 11.87% q/q to 1,885 which is an increase of 200 accounts - still a far cry from what should be happening in the market and yet another data point supporting the thesis that the banks are still engaged in deploying extend-and-pretend solutions in a hope of delaying repossession to allow the price to rise. This, of course, also indicates that the banks are still unwilling to face the music and deal with the most distressed borrowers by resolving residual arrears and shortfalls prior to forced or voluntary sales.

5) Top of the line: restructured mortgages numbers rose to 125,763 accounts in total an increase of 10,284 accounts or +8.81% q/q. Of these, 76,901 accounts were not in arrears at the end of Q2 2014 a rise of 13.96% q/q or 9,418 accounts. This is good news. However, 48,862 accounts that were restructured were in arrears an increase of 1.54% q/q or 3,714 accounts.


6) As you recall, I define my own category of mortgages: those that are at risk of default or defaulting, or in simple terms, "mortgages at risk". This category includes, for obvious reasons, mortgages that are in repossession, mortgages in arrears, but also mortgages that were restructured, but are not in arrears to-date (the reason for this category inclusion is that currently 39% of all mortgages that were restructured are in arrears, despite the fact that restructuring are still relatively fresh and more accurately reflect the underlying financial conditions of the households, on average over the last 2 years, 45% of all mortgages that were restructured continued to run or slipped again into the arrears). So the 'at risk' category is where potential future risks are likely to arise. In Q2 2014 264,460 mortgages accounts in Ireland (27% of total number of accounts) were 'at risk' - an increase of 1.54% q/q or 3,714 accounts. These accounts amounted to EUR46.06 billion of debt or 34% of the total mortgages debt outstanding. The value of debt in this groups of mortgages rose 0.78% q/q or by EUR357.8 million.


This is the underlying problem we will have to continue facing over time.

Thursday, January 2, 2014

2/1/2014: 'Rip-off Ireland' and Local Authorities' Rents


H/T to @SeamusCoffey for flagging the following chart from the CSO:


Two things of note:

  1. The 'deleveraging' of costs in Ireland (remember the 'competitiveness gains' meme?) is obviously not touching state-controlled rents that remain at the levels compatible to those in early 2008, while private rents index is running around early 2006 levels; and
  2. Since 2011 - when the current Government (led by the 'rip-off Ireland' opponents from the FG) came to power - Local Authority Rents are back on the rising trend.
Here is the same CSO data charted in its full glory and rebased to 100 = average for 2003


  • Actual Rentals (Housing and Mortgage Interest inclusive) down 8.28% in Q4 2013 compared to Q1 2007 average
  • Actual Rents Paid by Tenants are down 2.32%
  • Private Rents are down 6.61%
  • Local Authority Rents are up 25.97%
You know... 'protecting the worst-off' thingy etc, etc, etc...

Sunday, September 8, 2013

8/9/2013: Dublin's 'burgeoning' workforce attracts MNCs? Err... what?..

A quick post. Recent research note from one of the highly regarded property research outfits in Ireland cited the following sources of Ireland's success in attracting nine out of ten largest tech companies to Dublin: "low corporation tax rates and a burgeoning workforce which is young, educated and English speaking." This references not some abstract period of, say, 'since 1990' or even 'since 2000', but the last few years, as the argument is then carried over as a reason / a causal explanation for the reported boom in prime office rents in Dublin in H1 2013.

While I do not want to pick any fights over anything, least of all the 'young' bit (read my Sunday Times column from today on 'demographic dividend') or 'educated' part (see my view of our education system and skills/human capital on this blog) or 'English speaking' (slightly ironic, given tech employers are complaining about the lack of foreign languages skills availability in Dublin), I wonder what this 'burgeoning workforce' references.

Here is data from CSO on Dublin's workforce for Q2 (or H1) in every year on record: 


Can you spot 'burgeoning'? In Q2 2013, there were 555,100 persons aged over 15 in employment in Dublin region. This represents second lowest level of employment (after Q2 2012 when the number was only 7,700 lower at 547,400) since Q2 2004. In other words, our workforce 'burgeoned' into a 10-year slump in terms of employment.

Now, in terms of labour force numbers, in Q2 2013 there were 630,500 in labour force in Dublin. This marked an increase of only 6,200 on Q2 2012 and marked the second lowest level reading since Q2 2006. With all the positive demographics and the tech sector boom cited by the property researchers, the burgeoning we might have experienced in labour force levels terms was consistent with the hitting a 7-year slump. Slightly more 'burgeoning' than employment figures, but still not exactly exciting enough to stir any tech companies rushing into Dublin.


Note: I reference two numbers in relation to the 'workforce' term: labour force and employment. The latter measures those who currently work, the former includes the latter, plus the unemployed, excluding  those in education and training. I seriously doubt US tech giants are coming here for the pool of the unemployed. Which means that the 'workforce' that can be expected to be strongly positively correlated with incentives for the MNCs to locate here would be measured by employment figures, not by general labour force ones.

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

25/6/2013: Planning Permissions in Ireland: Q1 2013

The latest data on Planning Permissions was released by the CSO under a rather cheerful headline: "Dwelling units approved up 24.7% in Q1 2013" which prompted me to start writing a positive note. However, having updated the database, I could not believe my eyes. Not until the third bullet point in the release do you get the sense as to what is really going on in the sector - the fact confirmed by looking at CSO data, rather than reading the CSO release which focuses the top points of analysis on positive side of select sub-components of the overall sector performance. So here are the facts, as conveyed to us by the data itself.

In Q1 2013, total number of planning permissions granted in Ireland for all types of construction stood at 3,275, which is 1.35% down on Q4 2012. This marks de-acceleration of seasonally-driven 17.96% q/q decline recorded in Q4 2012. However, on an annual basis, allowing for some seasonality controls, overall number of planning permissions granted in Q1 2013 was down 2.76%, which contrasts against an annual increase recorded in Q4 2012 of 1.13%.

In summary, things are not going well at all. Q1 2013 marks an absolute historic low for any quarter since Q1 1975! That's right: we hit an absolute historic low in 37 years and CSO release says things are 'up' by focusing on sub-series before it reports in the text the actual aggregates.


In charts below, I marked current sub-period (since Q1 2010) low against historic low before the current crisis. Take a look.



Note: in Q1 2013,

  • Total number of planning permissions hit a historic low (as mentioned above)
  • Total number of permissions for dwellings stood at 862, the second lowest after the historic low of 832 hit in Q4 2012.
  • Total number of permissions for 'other new construction ex-dwellings' stood at 785, which is above the historic low of 636, but still marks a decline q/q.
  • Number of permissions for extensions hit a historic low.
  • Number of Alterations, conversions, renovations etc hit a historic low. 
Again, I find little to cheer in the above...

Thursday, April 4, 2013

4/4/2013: Irish Planning Permissions 2012 data


Per data released on March 22 by CSO, Irish Planning Permissions for Construction have continued to collapse in 2012. Full year data shows that:

  • In 2012 total number of all types of planning permissions issued in the state stood at 14,407 - an all-time record low (with records starting in 1992), down 9.91% on 2011. 2010-2011 rate of contraction was 15.11% and 2009-2010 rate of decline was 27.64%, so naturally for such steep drops in previous years, the rate of annual declines is moderating. 
  • From the pre-crisis peak, number of planning permissions is now down 76.90%
  • Planning permissions for dwellings fell to 3,643 in 2012, down 23.58%, having fallen 24.89% in 2010-2011 and 38.85% in 2009-2010. Compared to peak, the permissions are down 86.76% to a new historical low.
  • Planning permissions for other new construction rose in 2012 to 3,407 from 2,964 in 2011, a rate of increase of 14.95% y/y that follows declines of 7.52% in 2010-2011 and 29.01% in 2009-2010. Relative to peak, 2012 level of permissions for other new construction are down 82.4% against absolute minimum reached in 2011 when these were down 84.72% relative to peak.


In square footage terms, planning permissions issued
  • Fell 21.56% y/y for all types of new construction (these are now down 86.67% on peak, hitting a new historical low);
  • Fell 39.48% y/y for dwellings (these are now down 90.89% on peak, hitting a new historical low);
  • Fell 7.44% y/y for other types of new construction (these are now down 86.78% on peak, hitting new historical low);
  • Rose 0.52% for extensions (these are now down 68.87% on peak, having hit the bottom at -73.41% on the peak in 2011).

At certain point in time (soon, one assumes given the rates of decline on peak already delivered), a broom shed construction somewhere in West Meath will qualify as an uplift in the market....

Thursday, March 14, 2013

14/03/2013: Irish Construction & Building Sector Activity 2012

Latest index for Irish Building and Construction Production volumes and value is out today, confirming what I wrote about on the foot of new planning permissions data (here), namely that Construction and Building sector continued to shrink in 2012 and there is little hope beyond some public spending projects uptick for the already devastated sector.

Top headline numbers for full year 2012 (these are imputed from Q1-Q4 2012 data):

  • Value index for all production activity in Building and Construction sector declined from 25.9 in 2011 to 24.7 in 2012 (using base of 2005=100). This means all activity in value terms has hit another historical low for the series and is running at less than 1/2 of the level of activity in 2000 when the index was reading 53.5.
  • 2012 was the sixth consecutive year of declines in the sector activity by value and volume. 
  • Peak sector activity was registered in 2006 with index reading of 109.7, which implies a decline from peak through 2012 of 77.5% in value terms.
  • Value sub-index for Building excluding Civil Engineering has dropped from 20.9 to 18.2 between 2011 and 2012 (decline of 12.8% y/y) and is down 83.2% on peak attained in 2006.
  • Residential Building value sub-index is down to 8.6 in 2012 from 10.2 in 2011, marking a decline of 92% on peak (2006).
  • Non-residential building sub-index for value is down to 55.2 from 61.7 in 2011 and is 53.9% below peak levels attained in 2008.
  • Civil engineering value sub-index was up in 2012 to 66.0 from 58.6 in 2011 (+12.6% y/y) but is down 49.3% on peak attained back in 2007. 
Similar story is traceable across the volume of production indices.

Charts to illustrate (note, charts are referencing a different base - instead of 2005=100 these have been rebased to 2000=100 for more clear compounded effect illustration):




Monday, March 11, 2013

11/3/2013: Property tax and the markets for property investment

The Irish Government is about to bring in a property tax covering only residential property and excluding land holdings. This is the market for real estate investment that the Government is about to hammer even more:


All permissions for new residential construction are down 87.6% in 2012 (based on estimated full year figure using actual data through Q3 2012) relative to peak. The levels are so low, we are at a historical low now and 2012 was down on 2011. Declines in permissions were recorded every year since 2008. For dwellings - full houses - planning permissions are down whooping 91.8% in 2012 compared to peak attained back in 2005!


Overall planning permissions are down 77.5% on peak. Again, historical series low in 2012 (based on estimate):

This is the same Government that has attempted to 'revive' the property markets via various tax breaks in 2011-2012. Talking about 'policy consistency' then...

Sunday, September 16, 2012

16/9/2012: IMF on PCARs and banks recaps


In the latest IMF Article IV Consultation paper on Ireland, the fund made some interesting observations on the ongoing Irish property bust. Here are some of these:

Firstly a chart showing where we are at in terms of current declines in property prices relative to other crises and in duration:


Next, there's a very revealing statement on the banks recapitalizations process (PCAR 2011) in relation to mortgages arrears (the statement that predates Professor Honohan's expression of doubt that PCARs were robust enough to all dealing with the mortgages arrears):


"Residential mortgage arrears continue to rise, but remain within the assumptions for bank recapitalization. As of end March 2012, almost 14 percent of the total principal balance of owner occupied residential mortgages outstanding was affected by arrears of 90 days or more, broadly doubling since end 2010. [Note: IMF seemingly had no desire to update their analysis for more up-to-date H1 2012 data released by CBofI and CSO (see here and here) before they published the Article IV paper].

Nonetheless, the overall arrears balance, together with developments in house prices and
unemployment, remain within the adverse scenario of the Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR) that guided bank recapitalization in 2011.

[Italics are mine. The reason why I find this important is that the banks were not recaped to the adverse scenario requirements, but to the baseline scenario requirements plus cushion. The difference is significant: Overall, Blackrock estimated that BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging would amount to €27,522 million in baseline case rising to €40,119 million in adverse case. Of these, the Central Bank assumed that only €20,014 million will take place pre-2014 in the baseline case and only €27,722 million in adverse case. That's a difference of €7 billion right there. The CBofI then made some additional assumptions and determined that €18.7 worth of capital will be needed by the banks overall. Clearly, given that this was less than what the banks estimated themselves to be the case (banks own forecast provisions totalled €17.04-22.23bn for baseline to adverse scenario cases), the CBofI 'imposed' additional 'cushion requirements' to raise overall capital requirement under PCARs to €24bn. But, wait, that is not consistent with the adverse scenario that IMF is referencing above, which is €27.7bn! So the banks were not recapitalized to the adverse scenario levels and IMF is using this term 'adverse' here to rather politely point out to the Irish authorities that the proverbial sh*t might be hitting or about to hit the fan.]

More so: "It is notable that about half of total arrears arise from loans that have already been
restructured, although part of these arrears could have arisen prior to each loan restructuring, so the effectiveness of rescheduling of distressed loans is unclear." [Now, we know this much ourselves - in H1 2012, more than 52.65% of already restructured mortgages were in arrears (see here)].

"Repossessions and voluntary surrenders of property are also very low, cumulating to 0.2 percent of the stock of mortgages on owner-occupied dwellings in the 11 quarters to March 2012. This is consistent with the one-year moratorium on repossessions of primary residences  under the Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears, but may also reflect a need to buttress the repossession framework."

Some charts:


Two things to note here: table above includes voluntary surrenders of properties, something that CBofI does not ordinarily publish in their mortgages arrears data, and the chart below shows just how thin the margins are on PCAR 'stress scenario'.

So things, according to the IMF, are for now within the parameters of the adverse scenario and, per chart above, within the stress scenario. Which seems to be just about ok, when it comes to PCAR injections to-date. But crucially, there is stress building up here. Only 1 year into the programme of recapitalizations, the banks are close to hitting the wall again.

Sunday, May 27, 2012

27/05/2012: Residential Property Prices: April 2012

Much has been made in the media on the foot of the latest (April 2012) data for residential property prices in Ireland.

In light of this, let's do some quick analysis of the data. The core conclusions, in my opinion are:

  1. Data from CSO - the best we have - only covers mortgages drawdowns reflecting actual sales. So this is tied to mortgages issuance activity and is of limited use in the markets where cash sales are significant.
  2. If increases in prices are sustained, mortgages drawdowns might be reflective of improved credit flows or credit flows fluctuating along the bottom trend.
  3. The above two points strongly suggest that we need to see more sustained trend to draw any conclusions on alleged 'stabilization' of the market.
  4. Aside from seasonality, the data shows patterns of false bull-runs or 'stabilization' episodes in the trends that usually were followed by downward acceleration on the pre-stabilization trend. Not surprisingly, the core improvements in March-April 2012 are in exactly the segments of the markets where such false starts have been more pronounced in the past.
So caution is warranted. 

Top stats:
  • Residential property price index has fallen from 66.1 in February and March 2012 to 65.4 in April implying m/m change in overall prices of -1.06% - the shallowest monthly decline since July 2011, other than zero change in m/m prices recorded in March 2012. 
  • This m/m pattern of slower decline (to near zero rate of fall) from a steep previous drop, followed by re-acceleration in decline is something that is traceable to October 2010-January 2011, June-August 2011, July-September 2010, February-April 2010, October-December 2009, so caution is warranted in interpreting short-term 'stabilization' episodes.
  • Y/y index fell 16.37% in April, an acceleration on March 2012 y/y decline of 16.32%, but a very slight one. Current y/y decline is the second shallowest since November 2011, so no signs of stabilization here either. In fact, April 2012 y/y rate of decline was the 5th sharpest for any month since January 2010.
  • Index reading continues underperforming its 3mo MA which currently stands at 65.87.
  • Relative to peak, the index is now down 49.89%.
  • Thus, overall, by both, its absolute level, and its 3mo MA, as well as relative to peak, the index is at its new historic low. Stabilization is not happening anywhere at the levels terms.


Chart below shows sub-indices performance for houses and apartments. While it is clear that houses sub-index is the driver of overall prices, the apartments sub-index received much of attention in recent months. The reason for it is two consecutive months of increases in apartments prices. Details are below:



  • Overall, House prices fell in April 2012 to index reading of 68.1 from 68.9 in March, registering a m/m drop of 1.16%. This represents an acceleration from -0.14% m/m decline in March 2012. However, April m/m drop is the shallowest since July 2011. 
  • Despite the above, bot the index and the 3mo MA have again hit their lowest point in history of the series.
  • Y/y house prices are down 16.24% and this is the fastest y/y decline since November 2011. 
  • Relative to peak house prices are now down 48.41%.
  • Apartments prices index has improved from 48.6 in March 2012 to 49.6% in April 2012 (m/m rise of 2.06% following a 0.41% rise in March 2012).
  • However, m/m rises are not rare for the sub-index. Apartments prices subindex rose - in m/m terms - in November 2011 (+2.68%), December 2010 (+0.31%), December 2007 (+0.50%) and posted falt or near-flat (1/4 STDEV from zero reading) in February 2008, January 2011, May 2011, and December 2011. 
  • 3mo MA is now at 48.87% and this is the lowest on the record 3mo MA reading for the sub-index.
  • Y/y the decline in April was 17.88% while March 2012 y/y decline was 20.33%. This is the lowest y/y decline reading since January 2012. However, back in April 2011, y/y decline was 'only' 15.29% - shallower than in April 2012.
  • Relative to peak apartments prices are now down 59.97%.

Conclusion: any talk about 'price trends improvement' in apartments will have to wait for further confirmation of the upward trend.

Chart below shows trends for prices in Dublin - another focal point of attention for those claiming substantive change in property prices trends.


  • Dublin property prices sub-index has improved from 58.0 in march 2012 to 58.3 in April 2012, reaching exactly the same level as in January 2012. Thus, m/m index rose 0.52% which is slower than March 2012 m/m rise of 0.69%. Last time the sub-index posted non-negative m/m change was in July 2011 when it remained unchanged m/m and last time sub-index actually posted positive growth was in May 2011.
  • To see two consecutive monthly rises in the index, however, is rare. We would have to go to January-February 2007 for that. However, index posted a number 'near trend reversals' in the past marked on the chart. All turned out to be false calls and virtually all led to re-acceleration of the downward momentum compared to pre-event.
  • Y/y sub-index posted a decline of 17.30% against 18.31% in March 2012. In April 2011 y/y change was 12.96% - much shallower than current y/y decline.
  • 3mo MA is unchanged in April 2012 at 57.97 compared to March 2012, and is much lower than 71.27 registered in April 2011.
  • Relative to peak, house prices in Dublin are now 56.65% down which is identical to their position in January 2012.

Overall, all data points to potential stabilization that is in a very nascent state. However, this is certainly a local phenomena for now - with Apartments and Dublin properties showing some potential signs of improvement. Only the future can tell if:
  1. we are witnessing actual flattening of the trend, and/or
  2. we are witnessing a reversal of downward trend toward a positive (sustained) trend.

Friday, May 25, 2012

25/5/2012: Mortgages in Arrears: Q1 2012

Latest mortgages arrears data from the CB of Ireland came in with a slight surprise that most of the media should have anticipated. During the launch of the annual report, the CBofI has pre-leaked some of the top-level figures for arrears, with media reports of 10.5% (or ca 80,000) of mortgages in arrears expected in Q1 2012 figures. Of course, given the usual tactic of first exaggerating, then underwhelming (presumably there's some psychological strategy working its magic somewhere here), it should have been expected that actual numbers - bad as they may be otherwise - will 'surprise' to the positive side relative to the leak-related expectations. It might have worked.

Alas, the end numbers - whether or not they are better than leaked out 'estimates' - are pretty dismal.

In Q1 2012, there were 764,138 mortgages outstanding amounting to €112,688.5 million. The latter number is €789 million down on Q4 2011 and€3.27 billion lower than Q1 2011 figure. So in 12 months, with foreclosures and restructuring factored in, Irish mortgagees were able to pay down just 2.82% of the mortgages outstanding. This is not exactly a massive rate of de-leveraging for heavily indebted households.

Of these, 77,630 mortgages were in arrears over 90 days (up 9.4% qoq and 56.5% yoy), with total outstanding amounts of €15,386 million (up 10% qoq and 60.3% yoy). Previous quarter-on-quarter increases were, respectively, 12.7% and 13.1%.

Repossessions in Q1 2012 stood at 961 up from 896 in Q4 2011.

Restructured mortgages:

  • At the end of Q1 2012, there were 38,658 mortgages restructured, but not in arreas, up 5.06% qoq (against previous qoq rise of 1.16%) and up 5.44% yoy.
  • In addition, there were 41.054 restructured mortgages that were in arrears, up 9.23% qoq against previous quarterly rise of 12.67%, and up 56.25% yoy.
Overall, defining at risk or defaulted mortgages as those mortgages that are currently in arrears (including restructured and in arrears), plus restructured but not in arrears mortgages and repossessions:
  • At the end of Q1 2012 there were 117,249 at risk or defaulted mortgages, constituting 15.34% of all mortgages outstanding and amounting to €21.72 billion, or 19.27% of total volume of mortgages outstanding.
  • Number of mortgages at risk or defaulted has increased 7.93% qoq in Q1 2012 as compared to a rise of 8.39% qoq in Q4 2011. Annual rise in Q1 2012 was 34.83%.
  • Volume of mortgages at risk or defaulted has increased 8.09% qoq in Q1 2012 as compared to a rise of 9.8% qoq in Q4 2011, and there was an annual increase of 37.67%.
  • In Q4 2011, mortgages that are at risk or defaulted constituted 14.13% of the total number of mortgages, while in Q1 2011 the proportion was 11.11%, and this rose to 15.34% in Q1 2012.
CHARTS:



Note: more on this next week.

Tuesday, January 24, 2012

24/1/2012: Residential property prices - 2011 highlights

Latest Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) from CSO posts another monthly decline in the price series and marks deep drops in the property prices in 2011. Here are top of the line figures - end of year readings:





And updated Nama valuations referencing:

So to summarize (note - there will be more detailed analysis of this data coming up in later posts):

  • All properties index is now 31.1% below January 2005 levels
  • Houses are now down 28.3% below January 2005 levels
  • Apartments are now down 46.5% below January 2005 levels
  • Dublin all properties are now down 39.3% below January 2005 levels
  • Rates of decline (monthly) are greater than 1.5% (12mo average) for 3 months in a row for all properties and for houses.

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

20/12/2011: Residential property prices for November

Today's data focus for Ireland is on residential property price index for November.

Prior to today's release, in the 12 months through October 2011, residential property prices were down 15.1% year on year - steeper decline than in July-September 2011 (12.5%, 13.9% and 14.3% respectively). In 12 months through October 2010 the rate of prices decline was 11.1%, shallower than in the 12 months through last October. So price drops were accelerating before November data release. In fact, mom prices dropped 2.2% in October, against 1.5% mom decline in September.

The latest data, therefore, was expected to come in with some moderation in the rate of decline. And in that, there was no surprise - mom change for November is at -1.54%, ahead of September, but behind October reading. 


November index of all residential properties prices is now at 70.1, down from october 71.2. 3mo MA is down to 71.37 from October reading of 72.63. We have to go back to November 2007 to see the first time that the overall index did not decline (it stayed flat in that month) and back to September 2007 to see the last monthly increase in the index. 12 mo MA of monthly changes is now at -1.41% mom and year-to-date monthly average change is -1.49%.


Nama is continuing taking a hit on its valuations. Referencing back to November 30, 2009 Nama valuations cut-off date, November 2011 prices are down 25.35%, which, adjusting for LTEV uplift applied by Nama implies that Nama valuations on its residential properties portfolio are 32.13% under water. Correcting the above for 'burden sharing' cushion applied by Nama legislation, Nama is nursing a loss of 28.9% on its residential properties-related holdings.


As chart above shows, overall residential property prices are now 46.28% down on the peak and year on year the prices are down 15.64%.

Houses prices index has fallen from 74.3 in october to 72.9 in November - down 1.88% mom, In October, monthly rate of decline was -2.24%, but November decline is second sharpest in the last 5 months. Year on year, house prices are down 15.72%, while in october the same rate of decline was 14.89%. Relative to peak, house prices nationwide are 44.78%.

Apartments fared better this time around, with index reading improving from 52.2 in October to 53.6 in November, a monthly rise of 2.68%. The index is also more volatile than that for all residential prices and house prices. Last time we saw a rise in house prices mom was in August 2010, and last time we saw monthly increase in apartments prices was in December and January 2010.

Apartments prices are now -16.89% down yoy and this marks an improvement on -19.82% decline yoy through October. Relative to peak, apartments prices are down 56.74%.




In my view, the divergence between apartments prices and house prices, if sustained over time, will be signaling the overall collapse of the purchasing power by the first time buyers, as well as demand push toward lower cost commuting locations as cost of transport continues to climb up courtesy of the Government policies. It can also signal the reflection of improving rental yields for some, especially city centre-located - properties. It is worth noting that Dublin apartments drove the monthly change for nationwide figures reported above, with Dublin apartments price index increasing from 50.8 in October to 53.2 in November a strong gain of 4.7% mom and driving year on year decline to -16.1% in November against -21.2% in October.


Prices in Dublin (all properties) posted index reading of 62.2 in November, down 1.43% mom on October reading of 63.1. This was the shallowest monthly decline since July 2011 when the index posted no change mom. Yoy index is now down 17.62% in November from 17.52% in October. Relative to peak the index is down 53.75%.



Updating annual forecasts, I expect overall RPPI to post a reading of ca 71.27-71.30 or a decline of 41.7% relative to peak. For houses, I expect index to run at 74.5-75.1 for 2011, marking a decline of 39.7% relative to peak annual index, while for apartment the same forecasts are for 56.5-56.7 index reading and a decline relative to peak of 49.7%. Dublin prices are expected to end the year on an index reading of 63.5-64.0 - a decline of 47.9% on peak. Mid-points are illustrated below:



So, overall, no surprise - another month of declines, another month on the road toward the average price around 60% off the peak. One to watch here is the sub-index for apartments prices, especially in Dublin.


It's worth noting here that per NTMA (source: Nama, December 2011), commercial property yields have been rising strongly in recent months. See chart below. This can also correlate positively with the rental yields for Dublin apartments, especially for centrally located properties.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

1/12/2011: Sunday Times, 27 November 2011

Here is the unedited version of my article in the Sunday Times, November 27, 2011.


Since the collapse of the bubble, Irish perceptions of the residential and commercial property markets have swung from an unquestioning adoration to a passionate rejection.

As the result of the bubble, the overall share of property in average household investment portfolio is likely to decline over time from its Celtic Tiger highs of over 80% to a more reasonable 50-60%, consistent with longer term averages in other advanced economies. But housing will remain a significant part of the household investment for a number of good reasons.

While providing shelter, housing wealth also serves as a long-term savings vehicle and an asset for additional borrowing for shorter-term investments. Security of housing wealth in normal times acts as an asset cushion for family-owned start up businesses and a convenient tool for regular savings. Over the lifetime, as demand for housing grows with family size, we increase our savings, normally just as our life cycle earnings increase. We subsequently can draw down these savings throughout the retirement when income from work drops.

In short, in a normal economy, housing and household investment are naturally linked. In this light, the grave nature of our economic malaise should be apparent to all. Ireland is experiencing a continued and extremely deep balance sheet recession, with twin collapses in property prices and investment that underlie structural demise of our economy.

The latest Residential Property Price Index, released this week, shows that things are only getting worse on the former front. Overall, residential property price index fell to 71.2 in October from 72.8 in September. The latest monthly decline of 2.2% is the sharpest since March 2009 and the third fastest in the history of the index. Relative to peak prices are now down 45.4%. Take a look at two components of household investment portfolios: owner-occupied and buy-to-let properties. For the majority of the middle class families, the former is represented by a family home. The latter, on average, is represented by apartments. Nationwide, per CSO, prices of these assets are respectively down 43.7% and 57.9% relative to the peak.


The impact of these price movements is significant and, contrary to the assertions of the Government and official analysts, real and painful. House price declines imply real capital losses to households and these losses have to be offset, over time, with decreased consumption and falling investment elsewhere. Absent normal loss provisioning available to professional financial sector investors and businesses, households suffer catastrophic collapses on the assets side of their balance sheet, while liabilities (value of mortgages) remain intact. Decades-long underinvestment and low consumption spending await Ireland.

Dynamically, things are not looking any brighter today than a year ago. House prices have fallen 14.9% year on year in October, the worst annual drop since February 2010. Apartments prices are down 19.8% over the last 12 months – the worst annualized performance since April 2010.  Given the price dynamics over the last three years, as well as the current underlying personal income, interest rates and rental yields fundamentals, Irish property prices remain at the levels above the short-term and medium-term equilibrium. This means we can expect another double-digit correction in 2012 followed by shallower declines in 2013.



Not surprisingly, the collapse of the property markets in Ireland is mirrored by an even deeper crash in overall investment activity in the economy. The latest National Accounts data shows that in 2010, gross fixed capital formation in Ireland declined to €19 billion in constant prices. This year, data to-date suggests that capital formation will drop even further, to ca €17 billion or almost 58% below the peak levels. In historical terms, these levels of investment activity are comparable only with 1996-1997 average. If we assume that the excess investments in the property sector were starting to manifest themselves around 2002, to get Irish economy back to pre-boom investment path would require gross fixed capital investment of some €26.9 billion per annum or more than 60% above current levels.

Between 2000 and 2009, Irish economy absorbed some €319 billion in new fixed capital investments. Assuming combined rate of amortization and depreciation of 8% per annum, just to keep that stock of capital in working shape requires €25.5 billion of new investment. This mans that in 3 years since 2009, the Irish economy has lost some €15.5 billion worth of fixed capital to normal wear-and-tear. In short, we are no longer even replacing the capital stock we have, let alone add new productive capacity to this economy.

Looking into sectoral distribution of investment, all sectors of economic activity outside building and construction have seen their capital investment fall by between 18.4% in the case of Fuel and Power Products to 70.4% in the case of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector. So the aforementioned aggregate collapse of investment is replicated across the entire economy.

The dramatic destruction of capital investment in the private sector is not being helped by the fact that Government capital expenditure is also contracting. In 2010, Voted Capital Expenditure by the Irish Government declined to €5.9 billion. This year, based on 10 months through October data, it is on track to fall even further to €4 billion – below the target of €4.35 billion and more than 53% below the peak. In fact, the entire adjustment in public expenditure to-date can be attributed to the capital spending cuts, as current expenditure actually rose over the years of crisis. Since 2008, current expenditure by the state is up 1.9% or €775 million this year, based on the data through October. Thus in 2008, Irish Government spent 17.4% of its total voted expenditure on capital investment. This year the figure is likely to be under 8.8%.

Forthcoming Budget 2012 changes are likely to make matters worse for capital investment. In addition to taking even more cash out of the pockets of those still in employment – thereby reducing further the pool of potential savings – the Government is likely to bring in the first measures of property taxation. This will reinforce households’ expectations that by 2013-2014 Ireland will have a residential property tax that will place disproportional burden on urban dwellers – the very segment of population that tends to invest more intensively over time in property improvements, making the urban stock of housing more economically productive than rural. A tax measure that would be least distorting in terms of incentives to increase productivity of the housing stock – a site-value tax – now appears to be abandoned by the Government, despite previous commitments to introduce it.

Furthermore, we can expect in the next two years abolition of capital tax reliefs, increases in capital tax rates and high likelihood of some sort of wealth taxes – direct levies on capital and/or savings for ordinary households. In the case of the euro area break up, Ireland will also see draconian capital controls.

In short, we are now set to experience an 8-10 years period of direct and accelerating destruction of our capital base. It doesn’t matter which school of economic thought one belongs to, there can be no recovery without capital investment returning back to growth.



Box-out:

In the recent paper titled “The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to Be Joined at the Hip”, published last month, two IMF researchers identify Europe’s Lehman’s moment in the global financial crisis as the day when the Irish Government nationalized the Anglo Irish Bank. In contrast to the current and previous Governments’ assertions, the IMF study argues that the Anglo was not a systemically important bank worthy of a rescue. As the paper puts it: “The problems [of collapsing financial sector valuations] entered a new phase – becoming a full-blown crisis – with the nationalisation of Anglo Irish in January 2009. The relevance of Anglo is, at first, not obvious, since it was a small bank in a relatively small country. However, …it is possible that the large fiscal costs as a share of Ireland’s GDP associated with this rescue raised serious concerns about fiscal sustainability. Suddenly, the ability of the sovereigns to support the financial sector came into question.” In other words, far from helping to avert or alleviate the crisis, Anglo nationalization caused the crisis to spread. “In retrospect, the nature of the crisis prior to Anglo Irish was simple, being mostly driven by problems in the financial sector… The winding down of Anglo Irish, for example, would have been preferable to its nationalization…” In effect, the previous Government made Anglo systemically important by rescuing it. If there ever was a better example of the medicine that kills the patient.