Showing posts with label Ireland and Greece. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ireland and Greece. Show all posts

Saturday, February 25, 2012

25/02/2012: Poster-boys of Recovery?

So does this really, I mean really, look like a recovery to any one of you?


The chart above plots evolution of nominal GDP in current US dollars from the pre-crisis peak (set = 100 for every country) through years following the beginning of the crisis (t=0). All data - IMF WEO and September 2011-February 2012 country-specific updates.

Monday, February 15, 2010

Economics 15/02/2010: Ireland and the Euro

Sunday Times, February 14, 2010.

Like a namesake of Federico Fellini’s 1983 classic, E la nave va (And the ship sails on), the Greek debt saga continues its course toward the increasingly inevitable default. Another week, another impenetrable web of announcements, and no real solutions. At this stage, the EU’s ability to resolve the crisis is no longer a matter of markets trust and the reputational costs for the euro are becoming more than evident.

So much so that conservative and forward-looking ECB is starting to think of contingency planning. A source close to Frankfurt has told me earlier in the week that some ECB economists are contemplating the likely run on the euro leading to a 20-25% devaluation of the currency to bring it virtually to parity with the dollar. If that happens, an interest rates hike of 50 basis points or more will be a strong possibility sometime before the end of Q3 2010. A derailment of the nascent economic recovery in the core euro zone countries will be virtually assured.
The plan, currently under discussion at the EU level, involves a guarantee on Greek debt, plus a package of subsidised loans both underwritten by other euro zone countries (re: Germany). The problem is that this is unlikely to be enough.

Greek problems are not cyclical and will not go away once the markets calm down. Country structural deficit, in line with Ireland’s is around 60-70 percent of the overall exchequer annual shortfall. And unlike Ireland, Greece is facing an acute problem refinancing its gargantuan public debt. Worse than that, the latest revelations concerning the complex derivative contracts used by the Greek authorities to hide a significant share of its deficit over the recent years clearly show that the country will have to be much more aggressive in scaling back its annual deficits in order to be able to issue new bonds. The EU latest plan does not facilitate any of these measures. Neither does it have a credible enforcement mechanism. Should Greece decide at any point in the future to renege on its obligations under the rescue package, the entire crisis will be replayed tenfold. And the threat of this gives the Greeks a trump card against the EU Commission under collective guarantees.

Thus, currently, there are only three economically feasible structural solutions to the ongoing crisis in the euro area.

The best option would be a massive injection of liquidity across the common currency area. Minting a fresh batch of euros worth around €1-1.5 trillion and disbursing the currency to the national Governments on a per-capita basis would allow the PIIGS some breathing room in dealing with their deficit and debt problems. At the same time, countries like Germany, with more fiscally sound public spending habits, would be able to use this money to stimulate domestic demand and savings through tax credits and investment.

The drawback of such a plan is that it can reignite inflationary pressures within the euro area. This risk, in my view, is misplaced. Given structural weakness in consumer demand and continued cyclical weakness in new business investment, it is unlikely that much of the freshly-minted cash will go anywhere other than savings. Incidentally, with most the money flowing back into the banking sector, the ECB can then use this increase in deposits to close down some of the asset-backed lending positions that euro area banks have built up with Frankfurt.

Two other solutions involve introduction of a parallel ‘weak’ euro for PIIGS, or an outright bailout of Greece, Portugal, and possibly Spain and Ireland, through a partial pay-down of these countries debts. Both would have dire consequences for the euro itself.

The logistics of running two parallel currencies within a block of countries under a single-handed management of the ECB will produce more than confusion in the markets. The monetary policy required for the ‘weak’ euro state would entail interest rates at roughly triple those in the ‘strong’ euro countries, with the resultant potential for an explosion of carry trades unfolding within a single monetary union.

In addition, there is no mechanism by which either Greece or any other country can be compelled to switch to a ‘weak’ euro. In Ireland’s case, being forced into a ‘weak’ euro will be a disaster for the longer term prospects of maintaining strong presence of the US and UK multinationals here who rely on out full membership in the common currency club to drive their transfer pricing.

An outright paydown of the PIIGS debts – no matter how tough the EU Commission gets in terms of talking up ‘conditional lending’ and ‘direct supervision’ provisos of such an action – will result in an unenforceable lending from Germany to the PIIGS.


From Ireland’s point of view, however, the inevitable outcome of all possible alternatives for dealing with Greece will be devaluation of the euro close to parity with the US dollar. And here may lie the best news Irish exporting firms have heard since the beginning of this recession.

Given the dynamics of our exports-producing sectors, Ireland desperately needs a shot in the arm to stay alive as economy through 2010.

Per CSO, our MNCs-dominated modern manufacturing – the source of most of our goods exports – has managed to post a spectacular 14.5% seasonally-adjusted drop in production in Q4 2009. Pharmaceuticals output declined a 7.5% in the last quarter, while computer, electronic and optical equipment sector – another pillar of our exporting activities was down 14.9% in December 2009. It all points to growing weakness in exports-driven high value added segment of our manufacturing. In short, Ireland can use a serious devaluation of the euro on the exporting side.

But a silver lining never comes without some cumulus clouds in tow.

A devaluation – while a boom for exporters – will act to reduce consumer spending and, through higher cost of imports, will further reduce income available for domestic savings and investment. Given the already abysmally low levels of personal consumption, it is highly likely that this will trigger more household defaults on debt and mortgages.

Furthermore, a devaluation can trigger rising inflation across the euro area which, once imported into Ireland, will undermine the gains in competitiveness achieved during the current crisis. For comparison, consider the case of Ireland v Greece. In his recent note, NIB’s Chief Economist, Ronnie O’Toole highlighted the fact that between mid 2008 and the end of 2009, Irish consumer prices have fallen some 4.6%. In contrast, Greece saw its prices rise some 2.3% over the same period. Of course, falling price levels imply that it is much easier for companies and governments to cut nominal wages. A new bout of inflation induced by the EU solutions to the Greek crisis can wipe out this advantage.

Alas, no one so far has noticed that in both, Ireland and Greece, a cut in nominal wages in line with inflation will do two things. One – it will leave real wages – the stuff that private sector producers really care about – intact. And it will be a magnitude of 3-4 times too little for repairing the Exchequer balance sheet. With both countries facing a 2010 deficit of 10-11% of GDP, a 5% cut in public sector wages is equivalent to applying Bandaid to a shark bite.

And a rise in euro area inflation will have an adverse impact on Irish exporters. Despite devaluation, many of our MNCs and indigenous exporting companies buy large quantities of raw and intermediate inputs from abroad. The rise in the cost of imports bill will partially cancel out the gains in final prices achieved due to devaluation. This is especially significant for the companies trading in modern higher value-added sectors, where geographically diversified multinationals use Ireland as a later stage production base with intermediate inputs coming from other EU countries and the US.

Lastly, a devaluation of the euro close to the dollar parity is likely to trigger monetary tightening by the ECB, with interest rates rising by 50 basis points in the next six months. Coupled with reduced provision of new liquidity by Frankfurt, the resulting credit crunch on the Irish banks will trigger a massive jump in the burden of mortgages here. Needless to say, even with booming exports, Ireland Inc will be in deep trouble as trade credits, corporate funding and personal loans will be pushed deep into red by rising costs of borrowing.

At this stage, we really are caught between a rock and a hard place.

Friday, February 5, 2010

Economics 05/02/2010: Prepare for a new slide

Fasten your seat belts and prepare for a new round of bad news. Globally this time around.

All data for January-February is showing that the pressures of jobless recoveries around the world, coupled with continued weaknesses in financial sector and money supply (despite unprecedented stimulus deployment and helicopter drops - more like blanket bombings - of liquidity) are over-powering the weak positive momentum in growth.


December retail season was, officially, a disappointment – down 1.6% on 2008 season across the euro area. The headline Eurozone Manufacturing PMI reached 52.4 in January, highest reading for two years. The index stood at 51.6 in December, so the rise was marginal.

There were noticeable disparities in performance between national manufacturing economies. Countries reporting an increase in output were Germany, France, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands. All improved on December. Spain, Ireland and Greece all recorded lower output and faster rates of contraction.

Sector data indicated that capital and intermediate goods fared best in January. Growth consumer goods production is falling below that achieved in the previous month.

Growth of new orders was the strongest since June 2007 and faster than the earlier flash estimate. The gain in the index between its flash and final releases was the greatest since flash PMI data were first compiled at the start of 2006. New export orders rose at an above flash estimate pace that was the quickest since August 2007. See Ireland PMI in my Sunday Times article this week.

Despite rise in core PMI, manufacturing continued to shed jobs during January, across the Eurozone.

Core retail sales (ex-motors) in Germany were weaker in November than previously reported (down 1.7% mom) but rose 0.8% mom in December. Car sales are down 40% quarter on quarter –driven by the end of the scrappage scheme. Which, of course, shows that Irish experiment with temporary programmes of subsidies is unlikely to work. Interestingly, in Germany, scrappage scheme has benefited primarily foreign manufacturers. Of course, the reason for this is that German car makers are primarily at the top of the price proposition distribution and in a recession, subsidy or none, they will suffer. Foreign care makers sales rose 26% in December and 38% in January, before the scrappage scheme shut down. Domestic car sales were flat.

Sign of troubles ahead for exports growth – German manufacturing orders are down 2.3% in December while output contracted 2.6%.

Greece and Portugal are clearly in the news flow. Both have no market credibility when it comes to their deficits. And the reports from the ground are even worse with virtually all vox-pop reporting suggesting that populations of both countries are in deep denial of the reality. People are talking about ‘fat cat managers earning hundreds of thousand euros’ while ‘ordinary people are suffering’. Long legacy of communist and socialist politics in both countries is clearly evident in the popular unwillingness to face the music.

The next points of pressure will be Ireland and Spain.

On Ireland’s fiscal position and PMIs – read my Sunday Times article this weekend.

On Spain: the country is about 3 times bigger in economic terms than Greece and Portugal – accounting for roughly 11.8% of the euro area GDP. Troubles here will be a much bigger problem for the Eurozone than all the rest of the PIIGS (less Italy) combined. Meanwhile, Spain’s unemployment is rising (just as Ireland's), adding some 125,000 to the dole counts in January. 19% of Spaniards are now officially unemployed, as opposed to Ireland’s 12.7%. In terms of hidden unemployment, Spains problems are also much tougher than Ireland’s especially since grey markets for construction workers which sustained unofficial employment during the boom are now shut in Spain.


Credit is still tight in the euro area and the FX valuations are still around $/€1.36 – way too high for an exports recovery.

It is now painfully clear that the only thing that can resolve euro area’s problem would be a massive one-off emission of liquidity directly into the government budgets. To do this, the ECB can set a target of, say, €1,000 per capita for the eurozone economies, disbursed to each country based on their population. Anything else simply won’t do.

But even such a measure will not provide sufficient support for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain – only a temporary reprieve.


UK
’s economy is also in stagnation pattern with full-time employment still falling, individual, insolvencies up to record highs. The uptick in house prices in late 2009 is likely to have been temporary and driven by speculative ‘testing the water’ by international investors. Manufacturing PMI is up robustly January to 56.7, its highest level since October 1994, and from 54.6 in December. The increase was driven by new orders, which rose at the fastest pace in six years, as well as companies' efforts to clear backlogs of existent orders. It remains to be seen if this pace of improvements is sustainable. Services sector PMI meanwhile contracted rapidly from 56.8 in December to 54.5 in January, marking the slowest activity in five months.

Here is a little fact to put things into perspective – manufacturing accounts for less than 20% of the UK economy, while services account for 76%.


Overall, this recovery is coming along with more stress and strain on the labour markets. All global indicators are now appearing to have peaked back in Q4 2009, with the new year starting on downward trajectory. Inventory cuts passed in previous quarters are now being worked out and there is little sign this process will be picked up by a structural increase in new orders. All in, jobs growth is now severely lagging that achieved in the end of the previous recessions. In this environment, growth favours the US where jobs cuts were much more significant and early, allowing firms to rebuild their margins before the onset of any demand improvements. Eurozone is, in contrast, toast. Indicative of this is the volume of global trade – with Baltic Dry Goods index down to 2704 today as contrasted by 3335 reading 3 months ago.


Strategically – I would short Europe as an index, but look for low cost medium margin operations for a long position.