Showing posts with label Euro zone crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Euro zone crisis. Show all posts

Thursday, August 22, 2013

22/8/2013: Sovereign Default Risk & Banks in the Euro Area Setting: Harald Uhlig


Harald Uhlig's latest paper "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union" (CEPR DP9606, August 2013, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9606) "seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union".

The rationale for the paper is that the "European Monetary Union is in distress. Mechanisms that were meant to safe-guard key institutions and to assure stability have become sources of balance sheet risk for these very institutions. Liquidity provision within
the European Monetary Union rests upon repurchase agreements, by which banks guarantee the repurchase of assets deposited with the ECB. If either the bank fails or the asset fails, but not both, this mechanism safe-guards the repayment to the ECB, since it can either rely on the repurchase by the bank or sell the asset. However, when both fail as well as the bank home country fails, the ECB incurs a loss."

Abstracting away from the (important) debate about the implications of such a 'loss', the theoretical framework described by Uhlig is insightful and interesting. The author assumes "that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds."

Furthermore, "In the model, banks pursue their investment strategy voluntarily: it is up to regulators to potentially constrain them. Other explanations are conceivable, of course". This is different from the currently dominant views, as per Reinhart (2012a) as well as Claessens and Kose (2013). Specifically, it is distinct from Reinhart (2012b) argument as to why banks hold bonds of their home country. Reinhart argues that in a “financial repression” setting the regulators "make
[the banks] hold the sovereign bonds, perhaps with strong-arm tactics, perhaps in exchange for “looking the other way” concerning weak portfolios of commercial loans and mortgages, or simply as a “favor” in a long, ongoing relationship. Since the banks could potentially refuse, though at considerable cost, it still must ultimately be preferable to them to hold own-country bonds rather than invest elsewhere or to close: so, in some ways, this paper may also be understood as a model of financial repression." Another view for the system by which the banks end up holding rising exposures to domestic sovereign bonds is a political economy argument: "if sovereign bonds are held by home banks, it makes it politically harder to default on these bonds, as this will hurt domestic banks and savers. If so, then such a portfolio arrangement might serve as a commitment device for the government in trouble."

Uhlig's (2013) paper is not covering the underlying reasons for the holding of the bonds.

Overall, "the issue of sovereign default risk, bank portfolios and the role of the central bank has received considerable attention in the recent literature. Acharya and Steffen (2013) is a careful empirical analysis of the “carry trade” by banks, which fund themselves in the wholesale market and invest in risky sovereign bonds. They document, that “over time, there is an increase in ’home bias’ – greater exposure of domestic banks to its sovereigns bonds – which is partly explained by the ECB funding of these positions"… Relatedly, Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno (2013) show that USD-denominated sovereign bonds of Euro zone countries became substantially cheaper (i.e., delivering a higher yield) than Euro-denominated bonds during the Euro zone crisis, and ascribe it to the usefulness to banks of Euro-denominated bonds as collateral vis-a-vis the ECB, while USD-denominated bonds do not offer this advantage." In addition, "Drechsler et. al. (2013) document “a strong divergence among banks’ take-up of” Lender-of-Last-Resort assistance “during the financial crisis in the euro area, as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral”. They test several hypothesis and argue that their “results strongly support the riskshifting explanation”…"

The above supports the Uhlig (2013) model that concludes that:
-- "…Regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, while regulators in other “safe” countries will impose tighter regulation."
-- "…Governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank."
-- "As a result, the monetary union has become a system engineered to deliver underpriced loans from country banks to their sovereigns, and to implicitly shift sovereign default risk onto the balance sheet of the ECB and the rest of the Eurosystem."

The last sentence is the key to it all: the euro system is now "engineered to deliver underpriced" credit "from country banks to their sovereigns", while shifting "sovereign default risk onto… the ECB and the rest of the Eurosystem".

Monday, July 8, 2013

8/7/2013: The More Things Change... in Greece

So Greece - off-the-charts in terms of not meeting its 'Programme' requirements has been fudged:

Now, recall:

  • Privatizations penned in for 2012-2013 are not happening - at all,
  • IMF requirement for at least full year funding held in reserves - not fulfilled at all,
  • 12,500 public sector workers that were to be put into 're-allocation or redundancy' pool are not there,
  • There is a massive overspend in a number of areas, including health, with a shortfall of EUR1bn at the state-owned EOPYY health insurer,
  • Income tax, property tax and corporate tax are not being enforced in full, despite numerous promises...
Earlier this am I predicted that:

And per IMF release above, this is exactly what has happened - fudging complete... And what fudging!
While Troika says that outlook for the country remain uncertain, there has been a staff-level (technocrats) agreement on new 'reforms' on top of the old one on which Greece failed to deliver. And these new reforms - hold your breath - are more cuts in health spending, repeated promises to cut 12,500 public employees, and more tax reforms... The more things change...

"The More Things Change the more the stay the same
The more things change the more the stay the same

Ah, is it just me or does anybody see
The new improved tomorrow isn't what it used to be
Yesterday keeps comin' 'round, it's just reality
It's the same damn song with a different melody
The market keeps on crashin' "...

Well, at least markets are not yet crashin' cause 'Greece really doesn't matter anymore' theory, right?..


Updated: 

The Eurogroup continued the endless parade of statements, comments and instructions today with this: http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2013/07/eurogroup-statement-on-greece/ which is largely the same drivel as already released by the Troika.

Some exceptions:

The Eurogroup also takes note that the economic outlook is largely unchanged from the previous review and is encouraged by the early signals pointing to a gradual return to growth in 2014.

I mean, ok, the logic is iron-clad: for months we've noticed that things are largely unchanged, but we've had rounds and rounds of changes made to T&Cs of the 'bailout' because things are largely unchanged. Still, our expectations never stopped changing... the recovery previously penciled in for 2012 has been moved to H2 2012, then H1 2013, then H2 2013 and now to H1 2014 or maybe H2 2014...

and more:

The Eurogroup commends the authorities for their continued commitment to implement the required reforms

But obviously, these are not enough and are not being implemented, so the commendations are for what?.. Alternatively - they are enough and are bing implemented, in which case why is Eurogroup issuing any statements on Greece?

At the same time, significant further work is needed over the next weeks to fully implement all prior actions required for the next disbursement

Aha, now I understand - 'further work' is needed... except, wait a second, the 'further work' is the 'prior-agreed work' that... per above statement is a part of 'commitment to implement'... which Greece either has delivered (per commendation) or failed to deliver (per rather urgent 'need for further work')... so which one?..

Much of the rest in the statement is rather specific and make sone wonder - if Greece is being asked to do in the next two weeks what it has failed to do in last 12 months, why on earth is Greece deserving and commendations or, alternatively, how on earth can it be expected to deliver that?!

Never mind, all of it is pure fudge - Greece will not deliver 12,500 souls to the Purgatorio and it will not be able to tighten tax collection (something it failed to do over close to 50 years) in time for October 2104. And the Eurogroup is not expecting it to. Instead, there will be noise of compliance, sound of cash register emptying, followed by 3 months of calm and German elections.

To quote another musician:

So long, Marianne, it's time that we beganTo laugh and cry and cryAnd laugh about it all again
Laugh about it, folks... for following the Eurogroup statement, the IMF Chief, Christine Lagarde went out to face the public with a claim that, hold your breath, Euro area needs growth and ... deep gulp of air, please... jobs.


So long, Marianne, it's time that we began...

Friday, July 27, 2012

27/7/2012: A thought... for a Happy Friday

Just a thought:

How soon will the Finns be sending a note to Merkel along the usual 'concerned neighbors' lines: "Angie, neighbors here across from de puddle. You've left for a vacation, we know, but yer kid from de Frankfurt is running wild partying. Shouts he'll buy up every lemon from the garage sale across the roundabout, yer know - where de siesta fans live - with mum's credit card. Threattens something about 'giving dem de bank'... Not to be too concerned, ...err... but de Dutch family de other side of de fence is a bit ruffled up by this ruckus... Though the pesky Frenchies the other side of the street are egging yer kid on. Enjoy sunshine, but do give your lad Draghi a buzz there to calm him a bit."

Monday, May 21, 2012

21/05/2012: Sunday Times 20/5/2012: Euro area crisis - no growth in sight


Here's my Sunday Times article from May 20, 2012. Unedited version, as usual.



Welcome to the terminal stage of the Euro crisis. Only two years ago European press and politicians were consumed with the terrifying prospects of a two-speed Europe. This week, preliminary estimates of the Euro area GDP growth for the first quarter of 2012 have confirmed that the common currency area, instead of bifurcating, has trifurcated into three distinct zones.

In the red corner, we have the pack of the perennially struggling economies of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The Netherlands, with annual output contraction of -1.3% in Q1 2012, matching that of Italy, has quietly joined their ranks. These countries all have posted negative growth over the last six months if not longer. Cyprus, Italy, and Portugal, alongside the Netherlands, registering negative growth over the last three quarters. Ireland and Malta, two other candidates for this group are yet to report their Q1 2012 results, with the former now officially in a recession since the end of 2011, while the latter having posted its first quarter of negative growth in Q4 2011.

In the blue corner, Belgium, France, and Austria all have narrowly missed declaring a recession in the last quarter, while posting 0.5% annual growth or less.

Lastly, in the green corner, Estonia, Finland, Germany and Slovakia have served as the powerhouse of the common currency area, pushing the quarterly growth envelope by between 0.5% and 1.3%.

The red corner accounts for 40% of euro area entire GDP, the blue corner – for 29%. All in, less than one third of the euro area economy is currently managing to stay above the waterline.

Looking at the picture from a slightly different prospective, out of the Euro 4 largest economies, France has shown not a single quarter of growth in excess of 0.3% since January 2011. In the latest quarter it posted zero growth. Germany – the darling of Europe’s growth strategists – has managed to deliver 0.5% quarterly growth in Q1 2012 on foot of 0.2% contraction in Q4 2011. Annual growth rates came at an even more disappointing 1.2% in Q1 2012, down from 2.0% in Q4 2011. Italy decline accelerated from -0.7% in Q4 2011 to -0.8% in Q1 2012, while Spain has officially re-entered recession with 0.3% contraction in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012.

The Big 4 account for 77% of euro area total economic output. Not surprisingly, overall EA17 growth was zero in Q1 2012 both in quarterly terms and annual terms. The latest leading indicator for euro area growth, Eurocoin, reading for April 2012 shows slight amplification of the downward trend from March. In other words, things are not getting better.

The best countries in terms of overall hope of economic recoveries – net exports generators, such as Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands, are all stuck in either the twilight zone of zero growth or in a years-long recession hell.

Ireland’s exporting sectors have been booming, with total exports rising from the recession period trough of €145.9 billion in 2009 to €165.3 billion in 2011. However, the rate of growth in our exports has been slowing down much faster than projected for 2012. If in 2010 year on year total exports expanded 8.1% in current prices terms, in 2011 the rate of growth was 4.8%. Our overall trade surplus for both goods and services grew 12.8% in 2011 – impressive figure, but down on 19.7% in 2010.

So far this year, the slowdown continues.

The latest PMI data suggests that manufacturing activity is likely to have been flat in Q1 2012. Latest goods exports data, released this week, shows that the sector posted zero growth confirming overall readings from the PMI. The value of trade in goods surplus steadily declined since January 2012 peak of €3,813 million to €3,023 million in March 2012, and in annual terms, Q1 2012 surplus for merchandise trade is now down €99 million on 2011. Although the quarter-on-quarter reduction appears to be small due to relatively shallow trade surplus recorded in January 2011, March seasonally-adjusted trade surplus is down 22% or €850 million on March 2011. With patents expiring, the latest data shows that exports of Medical and pharmaceutical products fell €772 million in Q1 2012 compared to Q1 2011. Overall, comparing first quarter results, 2011 registered seasonally-adjusted annual growth of 7.9% in exports and 15.2% in trade surplus. 2012 Q1 results are virtually flat, with exports rising 0.03% and trade surplus rising 0.8%.

Looking at the geographical composition of our merchandise trade, until recently, our exports and trade surplus were strongly underwritten by re-exportation by the US multi-nationals into North America of goods produced here. This too has changed in Q1 2012, despite the fact that the US has managed to stay outside the economic mess sweeping across Europe. In three months through March 2012, Irish exports to the US have fallen 19.3% and our trade surplus with the US has shrunk 47.1% from €3.33 billion to €1.76 billion.

Services are more elusive and more volatile, with CSO reporting lagging the data releases for goods trade, but so far, indications are that services activity remained on a very shallow growth trend through Q1 2012. As in Manufacturing, Services demand has been driven once again by more robust exports, and as for Manufacturing, this fact exposes us to the potential downside risk both from the on-going euro area crisis and from the clear indication that our domestic economy continues to shrink even after an already massive four years-long depression.

No matter how we spin the data, the reality is that exports generation in Europe overall, and in Ireland in particular, is still largely a matter of trade flows between the slower growth North American and European regions.

In many ways than one, Ireland is a real canary in the mine, because of all Euro area economies excluding the Accession states, Ireland should be in the strongest position to recover and because our exporting sectors continue to perform much better than the European average. Yet the recovery is nowhere to be seen.

Instead, the growth risks manifested in significant slowdown in our external trade activity and in overall manufacturing and services sectors are now coinciding with the euro entering the terminal stage of the crisis.

Since the beginning of this week, Belgian and Cypriot, Austrian and Dutch, virtually all euro area bonds have been taking some beating. In the mean time, credit downgrades came down on Italy and Spain, and the Spanish banking system was exposed, at last, as the very anchor that is likely to drag Europe’s fifth largest economy into EFSF/ESM rescue mechanism. This week, in a regulatory filing, Spain’s second largest bank, BBVA stated that: “The connection between EU sovereign concerns and concerns for the health of the European financial system has intensified, and financial tensions in Europe have reached levels, in many respects, higher than those present after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 2008.” Meanwhile, Greek retail banks have lost some 17% of their customers’ deposits since mid-2011 and this week alone have seen the bank runs accelerating from €700 million per day on Monday-Tuesday, to over €1.2 billion on Wednesday.

This is not a new crisis, but the logical outcome of Europe’s proven track record of inability to deal with the smaller sub-component of the balance sheet recession – the Greek debt overhang. Three years into the crisis, European leadership has no meaningful roadmap for either federalization of the debts or for a full fiscal harmonization. There is no growth programme and the likelihood of a credible one emerging any time soon is extremely low. Structural reforms are nowhere to be seen and productivity growth as well as competitiveness gains remain very shallow, despite painful adjustments in private sector employment and wages. Inflation is running well above the targets. Austerity is nothing more than a series of pronouncements that European leaders have absolutely no determination to follow through. EU own budget is rising next year by seven percentage points, while Government expenditure across the EU states is set to increase, not decrease.

In short, three years of wasteful meetings, summits, and compacts have resulted in a rather predictable and extremely unpleasant outcome: aside from the ECB’s long term refinancing operations injecting €1 trillion of funds into the common currency’s failing banking system, Europe has failed to produce a single meaningful response to the crisis.

CHARTS:






Box-out:  Speaking at this week’s conference of the Irish economy organized by Bloomberg, Department of Finance Michael Torpey has made it clear that whilst one in ten mortgagees in the country are now failing to cover the full cost of their loans, strategic defaults amount to a negligible percentage of those who declare difficulty in repayments. This statement contradicts the Central Bank of Ireland and the Minister for Finance claims that the risk of strategic defaults is significant and warrants shallow, rather than deep, reforms of the personal bankruptcy code. Furthermore, the actual levels of mortgages that are currently under stress is not 10% as frequently claimed, but a much higher 14.1% - the proportion corresponding to 108,603 mortgages that have either been in arrears of 30 days and longer, or were restructured in recent years and are currently not in arrears due to a temporary reduction in overall burden of repayments, but are at significant risk of lapsing into arrears once again. The data, covering the period through December 2011 is likely to be revised upward once first quarter 2012 numbers are published in the next few weeks. In brief, both the mortgages arrears dynamics and the rise of the overall expected losses in the Irish banking system to exceed the base-line risk projections under the Government stress tests of 2011 suggest that the state must move aggressively to resolve mortgages crisis before it spins out of control.

Friday, May 4, 2012

4/5/2012: Fitch Bells: Ringing de Panic?

Yesterday, Fitch Ratings issued an interesting report, titled "The Future of the Eurozone: Alternative Scenarios". The report sounds alarm bells over what some markets participants have thought of as a 'past issue' - the risks of contagion from Greece to the Euro area periphery.

Fitch Ratings core view is that the eurozone will 'muddle through' the crisis, surviving in its current composition,  while taking 'gradual steps towards closer fiscal and economic integration'. 


The interesting bit comes in the discussion of possible alternatives and the associated probabilities of these alternatives. According to Fitch, there is rising (not falling, as we would expect were LTROs and Greek debt restructuring, plus the Fiscal Compact and the ESM working) risk of a protracted growth slowdown or political shock or some other shock triggering either a possible facilitated Greek exit from the Euro or a disorderly Greek exit from the common currency.


And, crucially, according to Fitch, this risk cannot be discounted. 


This bit is where Fitch's assessment is identical to mine and contradicts that of the majority of Irish 'green jersey' economists: the tail risk of a disorderly unwinding of the euro is non-zero and rising, while the disruption or cost associated with such a outcome is by far non-trivial. Prudent risk management policy would require us to start contingency planning and addressing the possible realisation of such a risk. Instead, we are preoccupied in navel gazing through the lens of the Fiscal Compact, and not even at our own 'navel', but at the European one.


Fitch view is that a full break-up and demise of the euro is probabilistically highly unlikely. This belief is based on Fitch foreseeing large financial, economic and political costs of a break-up. More interestingly, Fitch determines that a partial break-up of the euro zone - with one or more countries exiting the common currency -  would "risk severe systemic damage, although cannot be discounted". 


For those thinking we've done much to resolve the systemic euro crisis (by doing much we usually mean creation of EFSF and agreeing ESM, deploying LTROs and restructuring Greek debts, and putting in place the Fiscal Compact), Fitch has some nasty surprises. Basically, Fitch believes (and I agree with their assessment here), that "additional measures will be needed to resolve the crisis. These are likely to include some dilution of national fiscal sovereignty [beyond the current austerity programmes and Fiscal Compact], potentially some partial mutualisation of sovereign liabilities [basically - euro bonds of sorts] and resources [some transfers to peripheral states], as well as measures to enhance pan-eurozone financial supervision and intervention, combined with further institutional reforms to strengthen eurozone economic governance". Basically, you can read this as: little done, much much much more to do still...


It gets worse.


Of all the alternative scenarios presented, Fitch believes that the most likely scenario will involve a Greek exit, with Greece re-denominating its debt in a new currency and default on its bonds again. Per Fitch, the core danger will be to Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain based on:

  1. Greek exit creating an 'exit precedent' for the already distressed economies
  2. Greek default impacting adversely other peripheral countries banks (especially true for Cyprus)
  3. Greek default increasing the risk of capital flight from the countries
  4. Greek default triggering a run on peripheral bonds just around the time when the 2013 'return to markets' horizon is in the crosshair.
Just as I usually do in my presentations on the topic, Fitch distinguishes two potential paths to Greek 'exit' - a structured and unstructured or 
  • an "orderly variation with an effective eurozone policy response and minimal contagion" and 
  • a "disorderly variation", involving "material contagion to the periphery and a significant increase in contingent liabilities facing the core".
Ouch, I must say, for all the folks who lost their voice arguing that my views are 'unreasonable' and 'scaremongering'. Sorry to say it, risk management approach to dealing with reality requires taking a probabilistically-weighted expected costs scenarios of the downside into the account. Simply shouting "all is sustainable here, nothing to bother with" won't do.

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

13/12/2011: European Summit and Markets Efficiency

One thing that clearly must be disheartening for the perfect markets efficiency theory buffs (supposedly there are loads of them around, judging by the arguments from the 'State Knows Best' camp, though I personally know not a single one who thinks that markets are perfectly efficient) is the speed with which the markets produced an assessment of the Euro zone's latest 'Grand Plan'.

Frankly speaking, the ink was still drying on the last week's summit paper pads and it was already clear that the new 'Solution' is not a solution at all and that the Euro zone crisis is not about to be repaired by vacuous promises of the serial sinners not to sin in the future.

This blog highlighted back on the 10th of December (here) the simple fact that Euro zone is highly unlikely to deliver on its newly re-set old SGP criteria targets, no matter what enforcement (short of Panzer divisions) Merkozy deploy. And in a comment to Portuguese L'Expresso (see excerpts here and full text here) and elsewhere I have said that instead of resolving the debt crisis, European leaders decided to create a political crisis.

Many other observers had a similar assessment of the latest Euro Land Fiasco pantomime that was the Summit. And yet, despite the factual nature of analysis provided, I was immediately attacked as a token Euro skeptic and an Anglophile.

Now, more confirmation - this time from the EU Commission itself (presumably this too has evolved into a Euro skeptic and an Anglophile institution overnight) - that the propposed Merkozy Pact is (1) extra-judicial and (2) largely irrelevant to the problem at hand. Today's Frankfurter Allgemeine reports that the new Pact will be - per EU Commission opinion - part of an inter-governmental treaty, which is subordinate - in international law - to any European treaty. This, in turn, means that a country in breach of the 'quasi-automatic fiscal rules - 3%-0.5%-60% formula - can simply claim adherence to existent weaker rules established under the fully functioning European treaties. This, in turn, will mean that there can be no application of the new Pact rules.

Thus, the new Merkozy Pact is subordinated to the weaker fiscal rules under the SGP and any extra-SGP enforcement of these rules is subordinated to the SGP procedures. Can anyone explain how, say Italy, can be compelled to implement the new Pact, then?

Meanwhile, of the other 'agreements' reached at the Summit, the EFSF agreement represents the weakening, not the strengthening of the previous Euro area position. In fact, post Summit, the EFSF is about to lose its AAA status (as France is preparing to lose its own AAA rating). S&P has the EFSF AAA-backers on negative watch and under a review, Moody announced yesterday that it will be reviewing AAA ratings across the Euro zone and Fitch labeled the Summit a failure. And amidst all of this EFSF is going to remain about 1/3 of the size required to start making a dent in the Euro zone problems. That, of course, assuming it can get up to that level - a big question, given pending downgrade and previous difficulties with raising funds.

The third pillar of the Euro zone 'strategy' for dealing with the crisis - the permanent ESM - also emerged from the summit in the shape of a party balloon with a hole in its side. Rapid deflation of the ESM hopes means that even with 'leverage' option, the ESM will not be able to underwrite liquidity to Italy and GIP, let alone Spain & Belgium. Furthermore, there is a question yet to be asked of the European leaders. Fancying ESM at €500 billion might be a wonderful exercise in fictional narrative, but where on earth will they get these funds from?

The fourth pillar of the 'strategy' was the IMF merry-go-round loans carrusel. Now, recall that brilliant scheme. The IMF has strict (kind of strict - see here) rules on volumes of lending it can carry out. But Euro zone problems are so vast, the IMF limits represent a huge constraint on the funding it can provide to the common currency debt junkies. So the EU came up with an 'Cunning Plan'. The EU will lend IMF €200 billion (which EU doesn't really have) and the IMF can then re-lend EU between €800 billion (under old rules on IMF lending) or up to €2 trillion (under that new 'leverage scheme'). Note: IMF doesn't really have this sort of money either.

So a junkie will borrow somewhere some cash, lend it to his dealer-supplier, who will then issue junkie a credit line several times greater than the loan, so the junkie can have access to few more years of quick fixes. Lovely. When you think of it, the irony of the EU passing a new 'Discipline Pact' with one stroke of pen, while leveraging everything it got and even leveraging the IMF to get itself more debt with the next stroke of pen takes some beating in the land of absurdity.

But fear not. The IMF is not likely to engage in this sort of financial engineering. Not because its new leader, Christine Lagarde - who comes from the European tradition of creating massive fudge out of monetary and fiscal policies - objects to it. It is unlikely to do so because its other funders - the US and Japan and BRICs etc are saying 'No way, man' to the Euro zone's plans. The US expressed serious concerns that Euro zone's plan will lead to US losses on IMF funds, while Japan's Fin Min Jun Asumi said that Europe must create a functional firewall first, before any IMF involvement can be approved. He also stated Japan's support for US position.

And so we have it. Post-Summit:

  • There is no effective new 'Treaty' or enforceable new rules
  • There is no enhanced EFSF and the old one is about to lose all its firepower
  • There is no feasible ESM
  • There is no Euro-leveraging of the IMF
Oh, and the ECB is becoming increasingly non-cooperative too.

And amidst all of this, the newsflow gets only worse and worse for Europe's battered economies. Greece is now projecting GDP decline of 6% in 2011 and 3% in 2012. The new deficit projections for 2011 are at 9% of GDP or €2.6 billion worse than the annual budgetary forecast of 8.5% deficit. Ditto for Belgium, where 2011 deficit is heading for 4.2% of GDP - 0.6 percentage points above the budgetary target (€2.2 billion shortfall). And, of course, there is that post-boy of austerity - aka Ireland - where Government tax revenues are collapsing as data through November shows (see details here).

So reality bites, folks. Markets are clearly not perfectly efficient. But once they discover the truth about the Euro Summit, fireworks will begin.

Monday, December 12, 2011

12/12/2011: What if - the value of the punt nua?

For those of you have been reading recent (weeks old) reports that Irish punt, were it to be reintroduced, can witness appreciation relative to the dollar or 'old' euro, here's the table from Nomura research that, in my view, more accurately reflects what's going on:


Even the above estimation suggest long-term equilibrium value (5 year horizon post-introduction) for the punt, in my view, which means that on the downward adjustment path it is likely to undershoot the new equilibrium level and first move to a devaluation of more than 28.6%. The problem in terms of predicting the actual short-term movement in the punt is that we will have to deal with a number of problems that will take place simultaneously upon re-introduction of the new currency. The analysis is also sensitive as to the nature of transition from euro to the punt, as well as to the assumptions on debt to be carried over into new currency against the debt remaining in foreign currency.


Note: specially for those trigger-happy readers, this is not, repeat not, my view on viability of the punt or the desirability of exit from the euro or retaining the common currency. This is simply 'what if' argument.

Thursday, November 24, 2011

24/11/2011: Beggar thy citizens

Things are desperate on a new level across Euro area, folks. So desperate, the Euro leadership delusions have shifted up a notched from already feverish levels they reached before.

Until now, the talk was all about the miracle pills of first "The Firewall of EFSF" then "ECB rescue" + "Euro bonds", now the convoluted plans to underwrite the failures of the last decades are getting more esoteric and, oh so European, at the same time.

Recall the EFS 'Firewall' - launched at first with ca €275 billion in lending capacity, enlarged to €440 billion capacity, then planned for a 'leveraged' enlargement to €1 trillion capacity. Now, with realisation that (1) €1 trillion is no longer enough of a 'Firewall' once Italy caught fire and the rooftop of Chateau France is getting steamy too; and (2) There is no €1 trillion worth of international idiots (oops... err.. investors) willing to part with their money for the greater good of European 'solidarity' the EFSF 'solution' has fallen off the radar.

Next, enter the idea of the ECB rescue and Euro bonds. These too are largely problematic. The ECB 'rescue' option at this stage will have to involve €1.5-2.5 trillion worth of assets purchases - something that will be (a) costly (imagine what will happen to bonds prices if the ECB were to wade in with that sort of cash into the secondary markets) and (b) internecine to ECB's mandate and reputation (in other words, turning your Central Bank into the financial toxic waste warehouse will do to the Euro just what the PIIGS combined default can - destroy it). The Euro bonds option requires two impossible to achieve things: (1) finding idiots... err... investors willing to pony up even more cash than for the EFSF for an undertaking written against largely non-controllable borrowers with little prospect of achieving economic growth to sustain repayments of their debts, and (2) balancing the need to get another credit against the risk of destroying credit ratings (as Euro bond will in effect simply give Governments more debt and this debt will be senior to their own previously issued national debt). And, of course, the Euro bond idea requires much closer political integration first - something that will take years to deliver.

Smelling the rat... err... failure in the above magic bullets, some Governments are now desperate enough to resort to the classic European response to the crises: fleecing their own citizens to pay for their spending habits. Behold tax increases across Europe and Belgian plans to sell their unwanted bonds to their citizens (the story here). In the nutshell, the idea is that there are no idiots... err... investors out there willing to buy Belgian Government promissory notes (note: Belgium, of course doesn't even have a Government). So the solution - just as Joe Stalin did in the 1930s-1950s - is to sell these bonds to unsuspecting ordinary people of Belgium. To make the 'deal' even more egregious, the bonds are to be sold at a discount on the yields provided to banks purchasers. Not only will Belgian pople join the line of those who hold dodgy paper, cross-linked to their entire risk profile of living and working in Belgium and paying Belgian taxes, but they are expected to do so for less reward!

Priceless, really, folks. Comparable only to Irish Government 'Solidarity Bonds' and efforts to sell state junk to national pensions and insurance companies. In economics, there's a concept of policies that 'beggar thy neighbors' by shifting risks/costs/losses onto other countries via trade and investment restrictions, taxes and subsidies. In Europe, we are getting to the point of having 'beggar thy citizens' policies.

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

23/11/2011: Is there a run on the euro?

So let's ask that uncomfortable question: is there a run on the euro going on that is being carried out by ... the European banks? Or in other terms, have the European banks lost their fate in the invincibility of the Euro?

It appears to be quite possible, folks. Per Bloomberg report (here), 'foreign banks' deposits with the Federal Reserve have risen from USD350bn at the end of 2010 to USD715bn as of September 30. And per Bloomberg report, the number of foreign banks with deposits at the NY Fed in excess of USD1bullion rose from 22 at the end of 2010 to 47 at the end of September 2011.

And there is more: "demand for Treasury securities that mature in under a year has increased as financial institutions boost holdings of the highest-quality assets to meet new regulations set by the BIS in Basel, Switzerland. Bank holdings of Treasuries and government-related debt totalled a record of USD1.69 trillion at the end of October 2011, up from less than USD1.1 trillion in 2008," per Bloomberg.

More signs of a run on the euro: "Rates on 3mo [US Treasury] bills ended last week at zero, down from this year's high of 0.157% in February and 5% in mid-2007..." said Bloomberg report. This is linked in the report to the banks hoarding USD-denominated assets while dumping euro-denominated assets. And the price of 3mo cross-currency basis swaps (used by the banks to convert euro into USD) fell to the levels consistent with the spread of 132bps on euro interbank offered rate. In other words, the price of converting euro into dollars in the interbank markets is now the highest since December 2008.

And things are getting scarier - since the EU plans for bonds, more bonds and quasi-bonds announcement today, the US Treasuries shot through the roof. Today's sale of 5-year USD35bn US Treasury notes came in priced at a yield of 0.937% - the lowest on record. The cover was a hefty 3.15 - the highest since May 2011 and above 2.82 average cover in last four auctions.

This is not going all too well, is it? And then there's ZeroHedge piece on the run on European assets and banks from around the world (here).


Amidst all of this, it is ironic (or may be it is iconic) that just few weeks ago on September 26th (see link here), Mario Monti - or "Fool Monti" as I came to call him in a pun - stated:

"Oggi stiamo assistendo al grande successo dell'euro e la manifestazione più concreta di questo successo è la Grecia, costretta a dare peso alla cultura della stabilità con cui sta trasformando se stessa"
or translated:
"What we are witnessing currently is the great success of the euro, and its most solid demonstration is that of Greece, which is being compelled to adopt the culture of stability and transform itself".

Detached, clueless and in denial, even when appointed as 'technocrats', let alone elected, euro elites are really not a good example of the leaders we need.

22/11/2011: Contagion Complete - IMF goes leverage


So, the IMF has made a ‘bold’ move, announcing two measures custom-tailored to shore up the insolvent Euro zone until something else, miraculously and unexpectedly cures its deadly disease of too much debt against too low of the quality of its growth.

Details of the latest ‘Leverage Like Lehmans’ scheme.

The Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) “has been established to provide effective crisis prevention to members with sound fundamentals, policies, and institutional policy frameworks that have no actual balance of payments need at the time of approval of the PCL, but moderate vulnerabilities that would not meet the FCL’s [The Flexible Credit Line – see below] qualification standard.”

That’s a mouthful of gibberish. According to the IMF, totally healthy economies will be lining up to borrow from IMF even though they can access funding in the normal markets. Otherwise, they’d be in a distress and ‘prevention’ would really mean ‘once sh*t hits the fan’. Oh, and per IMF, it will be countries that actually don’t really need to borrow as such at all, as they will “have no actual balance of payments need at the time of approval of the PCL”. In other words, PCL aims to supply emergency credit to countries not in emergency and in no need of credit. Yes, folks, indeed they will.

“Members may request an arrangement with duration of between one and two years. Access under an arrangement with one-year duration shall not exceed 500 percent of quota, with the entire amount being made available upon approval of such arrangement and remaining available throughout the arrangement period subject to an interim six-monthly review.”

Here we have it again – if the PCL-using members sport “sound fundamentals, policies, and institutional policy frameworks” and “have no actual balance of payments need at the time of approval of the PCL”, why would IMF need to perform an interim review, especially within such a short time frame as 6 months? Normally, such reviews are carried out to ensure compliance with lending conditions that are designed to stabilize and fiscally improve borrowers’ performance. But, clearly, borrowers with ‘sound fundamentals’ etc have no need to improve their fiscal and economic performance.

“Access under an arrangement with a duration of more than one year shall not exceed 1000 percent of quota, with an initial amount not in excess of 500 percent being made available upon approval of the arrangement and the remaining amount being made available at the beginning of the second year of the arrangement subject to completion of the relevant six-monthly review. Purchases under PCL arrangements are repayable in 8 quarterly instalments 3¼ - 5 years after disbursement.”

So in effect, the IMF has created an up to 7 years lending facility (5 years to repayment from disbursement, plus 2 years to repay) which is roughly speaking similar to their ‘normal’ Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) loans. And that is for members with, recall, ‘sound fundamentals’ and in no need of borrowing. Presumably, you can see Sarko applying for one of them PCL loans to build Disneyland Paris Deux.

And notice the number – at 1000 percent the IMF will be leveraging member contribution some 10 times, to lend against SDRs. That’s a hefty leverage, especially in today’s terms.


The second facility created is less bizarre, although no less disturbing.

“Flexible Credit Line The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) has been established to allow members with very strong track records to access IMF resources based on pre-set qualification criteria to deal with all types of balance of payments problems. The FCL could be used both on a precautionary (crisis prevention) and nonprecautionary (crisis resolution) basis.”

So now, distressed sovereigns can borrow from the IMF either on the needs-based principle (just as the current lending by the IMF goes, except without any caps on how much they can borrow – see below) or on the ‘precautionary’ basis (presumably once you smell the rot, you can get IMF pre-approve you for a mortgage). The former is really a blank cheque for loans to existent and future delinquents. The latter is for those delinquents playing chicken with the markets: who finds out who first – the markets find out the dodgy sovereign or the dodgy sovereign finds the IMF.

“Members may request either a one-year arrangement with no interim reviews, or a two-year arrangement with an interim review of qualification required after twelve months.”

Now there’s something funny going on here. In PCL, a non-distressed sovereign with ‘sound fundamentals’ and in no need of borrowing will be lent to on the back of bi-annual reviews. In the FCL, a dodgy sovereign with unsound fundamentals (BOP crisis) will be borrowing without a review. I have no idea what is going on through the IMF minds, but might this be that the Fund’s effectively abrogating from any enforcement on LOLR loans in the Euro area?

“Upon expiration, the Fund may approve additional FCL arrangements for the member.”

Re: there is no time limit on the loans, so in effect the FCL can be the replacement of the existent more stringent LOLR loans

“Access is determined based on individual country financing needs and is not subject to a pre-set cap. Purchases under FCL arrangements are repayable in 8 quarterly instalments 3¼ - 5 years after disbursement.”


So there is unlimited leverage that is allowed under the FCL. Not even 1,000% or 10,000%, but ‘not subject to a pre-set cap’. Potentially, we are talking Lehman^n where n is any number between zero and… well ‘not subject to a pre-set cap’. The reason such extreme levels of leveraging are needed is that the European clients for whom such programmes are designed need well in excess of their SDR-linked funds, even if these are leveraged at 1,000%.

You see, leveraging SDRs (see allocations here) at 1,000% would allow

  • Spain to borrow some SDR40,234mln or roughly speaking (at 1SDR=€1.355) €54.5bn through which Spain will burn, oh, in about 3 months post borrowing.
  • Italy to borrow some SDR78,823 or €107bn which won’t float “Fool” Monti for too long.
  • Portugal to borrow SDR10,297mln or €13.95bn which is quite below the €20-25bn that it will require in Bailout-2 (see the story here) and that assuming that we leverage it up on top of already leverage-ridden Bailout-1 SDRs.
  • Ireland to borrow SDR12,576mln or €17bn – not bad, but not exactly a windfall should Irish economy take a turn for the worst. Note, this is roughly equivalent to what Blackrock estimated will be the losses on owner-occupied mortgages in IRL3 ‘big banks’. Oh, and don’t forget, like Portugal – we are already levered on our SDRs under the Bailout-1.
  • Greece, well, assuming Greece can borrow anything else from the IMF, since it managed to double-lever its SDRs in Bailouts-1 and 2 already, to borrow some SDR11,018mln or a miserly €14.9bn.

All of this simply means that if PCL/FCL to have any effect on Euro area debt crisis, it will have to be used as levered borrowing well by the likes of France and Germany to raise funds for… well, might it be EFSF? In other words, solvent member states can claim access to PCL to ‘insure’ private sector buy-in into EFSF. A sort of borrow to buy insurance policy stuff.

We, thus, are no longer in the world with over-leveraged banks, but in the world with over-leveraged banks, central banks, & at last, the over=leveraged lender of last resort. That’s what I call ‘Contagion Complete’. Next stop on the Euro train – the mine shaft. All aboard!

Thursday, November 10, 2011

10/1/2011: Some simple Italian Auction maths

Italy's latest auction of 12mo t-bills came in at:

  • Allocation: €5bln 
  • Average yield 6.087% vs 3.57%  in last month's auction
  • bid to cover ratio 1.989  vs 1.88 last month
The auction proves that
  1. Italy is now insolvent (reminder - Italy is heading for 120% debt/GDP ratio with average real growth rate 1990-2010 of under 1% pa, implying that as ECB bound for inflation, Italy's annual expected growth over the next 20 years is unlikely to cover 1/2 of Italy's funding costs for its debt)
  2. Italy is now illiquid (see chart below for funding requirements forward, courtesy of the ZeroHedge)
  3. EFSF is now blown out of the water, with Italy's funding needs over 2012-2015 alone accounting for more than 1/2 of the entire enlarged EFSF pool of liquidity (good luck raising that, folks)
  4. Italy's banking system is now insolvent as well, with Intesa's exposure at €60.2bn, UniCredit exposure of €49.1bn, Banca Monte at €32.5bn
  5. Euro area top banks are now also insolvent with BNP Paribas exposure of €28bn, Dexia (aha, that one again) exposure of €15.8bn, Credit Agricole exposure of €10.8bn, Soc Gen exposure of €8.8bn, Deutsche Bank exposure of €7.7bn
  6. A 30% haircut on Italy, in addition to 75% haircut on Greece requiring a direct hit on banks capital in Europe of some €315bn (that's on top of EFSF exposure to shore up Italian sovereign alone)


Tuesday, September 20, 2011

20/09/2011: EU banks losing corporate deposits & 'stress tests' scam

In a testament that the world continues to lose confidence in Euro area banking system, Europe's largest engineering firm, Siemens reportedly withdrew large amounts of deposits from the commercial banking system and deposited them with the ECB. The details of this transaction were reported in today's FT (link here) and other media outlets.

In the mean time, WSJ reported that documents distributed at the meeting of the euro area finance ministers in Wroclaw last weekend out to question the validity of the European banking stress tests carried out this summer.


Siemens withdrawal amounted, reportedly to €500 million and impacted "a large French bank", motivated by "concerns about the future financial health of the bank and partly to benefit from higher interest rates paid by the ECB". Again, per reports, Siemens now holds €4-6bn at the ECB, mostly in one-week deposits.

Siemens set up a banking arm almost a year ago to insure itself against adverse risks to liquidity flows in the context of the global financial crisis, enabling it "to tap the central bank for liquidity and deposit cash at the ECB"Siemens does not only use the ECB as a haven; it also gets paid a slightly higher interest rate than it would get from a commercial bank.

ECB, currently amidst sterilized bonds purchasing programme, uses deposit facilities to cut down on money supply increases created by it buying PIIGS bonds. To do this, ECB attracts deposits from commercial banks by offering 15bps margin on its deposits over 0.95% average interest rate for overnight deposits with euro are banks.

In effect, Siemens move kills two birds with one stone - the company achieves greater security of deposits (eliminating counter-party risks) and benefits from 0.15% spread on deposits - a nice sum amounting to €6-9mln per annum, which most likely covers its 'banking' operations costs.

In the severely distorted world of euro area banking, thus, smart corporates can have a decent free lunch, courtesy of ECB's continued insistence on protecting failed sovereigns and banks.


Per WSJ report (link here) EU banks stress tests carried out in July 2011 were based on archaic macroeconomic scenarios that did not cover the latest developments in sovereign credit markets. "The tests did not manage to restore market confidence,"reports WSJ based on the document discussed by finance ministers.

One specific macroeconomic assumption criticised relates to the scenario under which stress is applied to sovereign bond holdings of the banks - the core point of the entire exercise - "a scenario which was clearly taken over by events as months passed by."

So here we have it, folks, our ministers have now admitted what most of us knew all along - the stress tests in 2011 were as shambolic as those in 2010 despite being carried out under the watchful eye of EBA - the 'new' authority that is supposed to make the banks more transparent and better managed post-crisis.

I bet folks at Siemens Bank are glad they didn;t put much faith with euro area banks regulators...

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

13/09/2011: Global contagion from Greece

In the torrent of newsflow from the euro area, we are forgetting about the wider geography of implications of the Greek default. Here are some of the points in addition to my comment to today's article on the topic in Canada's Globe & Mail (article here).

There are two core pathways through which the Greek default will have an adverse impact on banking and sovereign risk valuations outside the euro zone. Firstly, there is the direct impact via foreign banks exposure to Greek debt. These range from small to medium sized and can be concentrated in a small number of institutions in each country. Secondly, there is a number of inter-linked second order effects, which tend to have much larger implications once propagated across the global financial system.

Direct impacts include:
  • Japanese banks hold $432 million in Greek debt
  • U.S. banks hold $1.5 billion in Greek debt
  • UK banks hold $3.4 billion in Greek debt
  • Bulgaria has bank credit exposure of $13.5bn to Greece (banks and sovereign debt)
  • Serbia's exposure is about $7 billion
  • Romania's banking system is tied into $20.2 billion of exposures to Greek banks and sovereign debt
  • Turkey $30.4 bn exposure
  • Poland $8.0 bn
  • Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic combined are exposed to some $460 million.
Indirect impact:

Were Greece to default, core euro area banks - Deutsche Bank (including Deutsche Post) carries ca €2.94 billion exposure, Commerzbank (€2.9 billion), but also SocGen, Credit Agricole, Commerz Bank etc will come under severe pressure to recapitalize. German banks have combined exposure to Greece of ca $22.65 billion, French banks $14.96 billion. Cross positions vis-a-vis Greek banks (with their exposure to Greek sovereign bonds of $62.8 billion) imply strong spill-overs. Thus, Greek default can lead to a severe liquidity crunch and flight to safety of deposits from not only Greek and euro area banks, but from a number of closely inter-connected banking systems, especially those with close trading and investment links to the European Economic Community.

This is bound to induce contagion across the entire euro area and spill overs to euro area banks cross links to Eastern and Central Europe and beyond. In effect, Romanian and Bulgarian banking systems are heavily dependent on Greek banks and their own banks collapse will put huge pressures on Hungary. The ripple effects of this can reach as far as Ukraine and Turkey.

There are other interesting cross-links worth looking at. Greek default can trigger default across Cyprus banking sector which holds ca $28.3bn exposure to Greek banks and sovereign debts (156% of Cypriot GDP). With 30% recovery rate on Greek default, Cyprus is facing with recapitalization bill for its banks to the tune of 10% of GDP. This, irony has it, can put pressure on Russian deposits in Cyprus and capital flows between Cyprus and CIS, which are massive - note that Cyprus is the largest single FDI transfer point for Russia with CB of Russia estimating that in 2007-2010 Cyprus banks channeled some 42bn USD worth of FDI to Russia.

To sum up, Greek default - which will inevitably combine sovereign and banking sectors defaults - will trigger a large-scale revaluation of assets and risk-weightings across a broad range of Eastern and Central European Economies, including Turkey, in effect slamming the breaks on the only growth engine within the European Economic Community and its nearest neighbours.

But there is a global cost to the Greek default as well, which rests with significant dislocations of risk-linked investment markets (equities and corporate debt), insurance and derivative products. The multiplier effects, consistent with 2008-2010 financial markets experience, suggest that magnification of Greek default costs across the global economy can reach 4 times the original volume of default itself. With 50% recovery rate on Greek liabilities, this implies a total expected cost of ca €240 billion, and with 30% recovery rate currently appearing to be more realistic, the propagated effects can sum up to €340 billion.

Thursday, July 7, 2011

07/07/2011: What's in the interest rates hikes

Working away on the data for PIIGS, I was interested in a question, what if the ECB were to go to the equilibrium repo rate consistent with the current inflation & growth environment?

In a recent post (here) I did analysis of the ECB historical rates in relation to eurocoin leading indicator of growth. This chart is reproduced here with suggested ranges for the repo rates consistent with current and with higher inflation.
So if the equilibrium rates are in the neighborhood of 2.25-2.75 percent, what would 1% increase in interest rates from June 2011 rate of 1.25% do to the cost of fiscal debts financing across the PIIGS?

Using IMF projections for debt levels for PIIGS through 2016 and assuming that all interest payments are financed out of deficits / borrowing, the chart below shows the extent of the increase in the cost of interest charges on government debt by 2016:
This translates into an increase in the annual cost per capita (2016 forecast) of:
  • €560.48 in Greece
  • €834.84 in Ireland
  • €546.74 in Italy
  • €309.24 in Portugal
  • €319.02 in Spain
Overall, the increases in interest costs for PIIGS will amount to ca €47.06 billion per annum or 1.23% of the PIIGS GDP and 0.44% of the Euro area GDP. Oh, and by the way, this does not take into account the additional costs of financing banks lending by the ECB.

So that should put into perspective my view of today's hike in the ECB rate, expressed earlier here. So happy wrecking ball swinging, Mr Tri(pe)chet & Co.

Monday, June 7, 2010

Economics 07/06/2010: Moving to the next stage in Euro crisis

Last Friday, speaking at the CPA annual conference (will be posting the highlights of the speech here later) I referred to a new 'beast' of the sickly-prickly Eurostates: the BAN-PIIGS. The new bit - 'BAN' - referred to Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands.

Fast forward two days, getting off the trans-Atlantic flight in hot and humid New York guess what hits my news feed? Belgium and France taking in water on the back of Hungary's woes (see earlier post here) and Ukraine is putting some new pressures on Euro area banks. French and Belgian CDS are moving up, while Austria is also back in the spotlight.

Brian Lenihan's announcement that Irish banks will be rolling over €74.2bn of guaranteed loans, bonds, and other systemic support papers before October 1 guarantee is scheduled to run out is not helping the markets either. As Morgan Kelly, Karl Whelan and couple other analysts estimated - once again well ahead of our gallant DofF 'forecasters' - everyone dependent on the Irish government guarantees will be pushing their re-scheduling/roll-overs before October hits.

Surprised? You see - we used to have one main crisis back in 2008-2009: insolvency of banks balancesheets. It should have been resolved directly through recapitalization of the banks via equity take overs by the taxpayers and restructuring of the banks debts. Foolishly, we chose a different path:
  • We facilitated banks rolling over debt - as if changing maturity date on the bonds that cannot be serviced changes the level of debt impacting the banks;
  • We then proceeded to allow banks to name their capital requirements by allowing them to spread their losses over longer time horizon, as if changing the date of repayments start on a defaulting loan can make the loan perform;
  • Following this, we pumped the banks with steroids of ECB facilitated lending - as if swapping few private bonds for ECB loans resolves the problem of balance sheet overhang;
  • We created Nama to take bad loans off the banks balancesheets, but, realising the futility of the undertaking, went on to impose unrealistically low haircuts that simply sped up some of the very process of losses recognition in the second bullet point above. Given the levels of real impairments on the loans, Nama only bought banks more time to spread their losses, thus avoiding recognizing the problem of weak balance sheets and amplifying the problem of insolvency;
  • Amidst all of this, banks became liquidity traps - sucking up vast amounts of funding. This was not fully satisfied by the ECB, so the banks engaged in predatory re-pricing of performing loans (mortgages etc) in a futile effort to get some more cash flowing;
  • The insolvency crisis blew up into a liquidity crisis.

So now we have both. And no real way of resolving either or both.

We could have sustained this game, teetering on the brink between full insolvency and a credit crunch, if and only if the euro bonds markets were at the very least stable and the ECB was capable of parking collateral garbage it collected in exchange for banks loans for a long time. Alas, two things are currently under way.

First, the French bonds have slid off their 'safe heaven' pedestal over the last couple of weeks, with spreads over the German bund going up eight-fold since the end of 2009. French bonds are now posing massive liquidity risk to institutionals holding them. French Prime Minister declared last week that: “I only see good news in parity between euro and dollar”. In effect, the French are now openly inviting massive devaluation of the euro - something that is bound to disappoint Germany.

Second, there is no room for more Quantitative Easing, as the ECB has been exposed as an institution that has run out of reserves cover for its own operations. Last week, ECB balancesheet had more than 150% ratio of immediate liabilities to assets held. And that was only for liabilities vis-a-vis Greek rescue package.

Something will have to give, folks. Just as Ireland has precipitated its own implosion by pushing the liquidity crisis on top of our already formidable insolvency crisis, so the ECB and the entire euro zone is now working hard to achieve the same. We are now well behind that point of no return in monetary policy where promises to act with support for the sovereign bonds will be sufficient to stave off a run on the bond yields. Instead, the ECB's rhetoric will be tested, leaving it only one option - start running printing presses.

Now, those of you who followed my writings on the issue will say 'Good, we need a massive - €3-5 trillion - issuance of cash, don't we?' The problem is that while the answer is 'yes, we do', this emission cannot simply involve purchasing of more Government bonds. We need a direct, un-levered injection of new money into the system and it must be broadly based - going not just to the public coffers, but to private economies of the Euro area as well. ECB printing cash to buy Government debt will not reduce the debt levels for the Eurozone sovereigns (which means insolvency problem will remain and will actually increase), nor will it resolve the problem of liquidity crunch in the block (giving money to the Governments to finance roll over of existent debt is about as liquidity-enhancing as burning this cash in a fireplace).

The end game, in my view, can be only across three major disruptions in the euro assets:
  • Collapse of the euro below parity of the US dollar; followed by
  • Debt restructuring through offers to the bondholders to take a haircut (possible ranges: 35-50% for Greece and Portugal, 25-30% for Spain, 20% for Ireland and Italy, 15-20% for Austria, Belgium... and so on). These will be attempted first privately - via larger institutional consortia, with both sticks (threat of default) and carrots (some sort of delayed tax incentives?) being deployed to get larger institutional holders to accepts a drastic shave off; and once this is underway, the inevitable conclusion to the crisis will be:
  • Imposing haircuts on banks bondholders, with the ECB standing by to hose the banks with cash, should liquidity dry up during the haircut imposition.
Finale: euro's credibility gone, euro/usd rate below parity persists, inflation will be running ahead of economic recovery and Europe will slide into a Japan-styled long-term depression.

In the mean time, before the end game, expect more bans on trading in various instruments (the French have finally agreed to the German-style ban on naked shorts) and more fiery rhetoric about speculators, destabilizing market forces and other gibberish from the dear leaders of Europe.


PS: All of this reminds me of a conversation I had with one very senior stocks analyst/strategist back in the middle of 2008 meltdown in the markets. I was concerned that the ways in which fiscal and monetary authorities were throwing cash at the banks were going to lead to both running out of policy space to continue accelerated supports for the sector and economy at large. "Charged by the bear, make sure you don't run out of all bullets early on. You might miss," I insisted. In response I was given a complete assurance that resolute actions on large scale (equivalent to unloading the entire magazine of ammunition at the shadow of the problem before actually having an idea as to what the problem really is) will mean that the 'Bear won't be charging for long'. I wish I was wrong... He still writes daily, weekly and monthly missives about the investment strategy for clients.